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This Note argues that the establishment of the Commonwealth government fails to fulfill the
requirements of a free associated territory as detailed in United Nations General Assembly Resolu-
tions 742 (“Resolution 742”) and 1541 (“Resolution 1541”) because the Puerto Rico Constitution
remains subject to the Territorial Clause of the U.S. Constitution. The Territorial Clause gives
the U.S. Congress plenary authority to govern territories of the United States. Part I of this Note
introduces the factual and legal background of Puerto Rico’s hybrid legal status. Part II describes
the different interpretations regarding the validity of Puerto Rico’s status in international law. Part
III argues that the present status of Puerto Rico requires that the U.S. Congress enact legislation
that allows a binding plebiscite to define the status of Puerto Rico in a manner consistent with U.N.
General Assembly Resolutions 742 and 1541. Finally, this Note concludes that the U.S. Congress
should act to prevent the continuation of a system of government where unequal treatment of U.S.
citizens in Puerto Rico is allowed under the U.S. Congress’ plenary power to administer territories.
THE STATUS OF PUERTO RICO REVISITED: DOES THE
CURRENT U.S.-PUERTO RICO RELATIONSHIP
UPHOLD INTERNATIONAL LAW?
INTRODUCTION
On November 14, 1993, residents of Puerto Rico voted in a
plebiscite to choose Puerto Rico's future relationship with the
United States.1 The plebiscite permitted Puerto Ricans to select
among statehood, independence, or commonwealth status.2
The plebiscite, however, was non-binding.3 As a result of the
1. Larry Rohter, Puerto Rico Votes to Retain Status as Commonwealth, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
15, 1993, at Al [hereinafter Rohter, P.R. Votes]; Maria T. Padilla, Siftingforfacts on plebi-
scite, SAN JUAN STAR, Nov. 12, 1993, at 31; Salsa with Fries, ECONOMIST, Nov. 13-19, 1993,
at 28; Rafael Matos, Commonwealth a winner with 48.4% of vote, SAN JUAN STAR, Nov. 15,
1993, at 3.
The term "residents" as opposed to "people" of Puerto Rico will be used in this
Note. Several commentators argue that the status of Puerto Rico should be determined
by all Puerto Ricans, regardless of their place of residence. See Manuel del Valle &Jos6
Luis Morin, Unravelling Puerto Rico's Colonial Status: The Puerto Rican Plebiscite, 1 INT'L
REV. CONTEMP. L. 126 (1990) (arguing for full participation in plebiscite by all Puerto
Rican people "wherever they are found in their diaspora"); Juan M. Garcia Passalacqua,
Institute for Puerto Rican Policy The 1993 Plebiscite in Puerto Rico: The Story, The Results
and Their Implications, 23-24 (1993) (maintaining that participation by Puerto Rican
community in New York for 1993 plebiscite inextricably intertwined Puerto Rican New
York residents in Puerto Rico's political future) [hereinafter The 1993 Plebiscite].
Despite the arguments put forth by these commentators, the focus of this Note is
the legal-political status of Puerto Rico and the residents thereof who are directly af-
fected by this status. This choice of terminology follows the current U.S. Supreme
Court treatment of Puerto Rico, as stated in Haris v. Rosario, 446 U.S. 651 (1980) (reaf-
firming U.S. Congress' power to treat residents of Puerto Rico differently than residents
of U.S. states). The Court in Harris v. Rosario maintained that it is residence in Puerto
Rico which affects a Puerto Rican's legal rights under the U.S. Constitution. Id. Fur-
thermore, while there were movements to allow stateside residents to vote in the plebi-
scite in New York, New Jersey, Illinois, Florida, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Penn-
sylvania and Delaware, the extremely low turnout in New York discouraged stateside
voting in states other than New York. Passalacqua, supra, at 23-24. In effect, the only
significant voting took place in Puerto Rico. See Rohter, P.R. Votes, supra, at Al (dis-
cussing vote in Puerto Rico); Padilla, supra, at 31 (discussing vote in Puerto Rico);
Matos, supra, at 3 (discussing vote in Puerto Rico).
2. Rohter, P.R. Votes, supra note 1, at Al; Matos, supra note 1, at 1; Salsa with Fries,
supra note 1, at 28; Padilla, supra note 1, at 32-34.
3. Padilla, supra note 1, at 32; Matos, supra note 1, at 4. A "plebiscite" is a "vote of
the people expressing their choice for or against a proposed law or enactment, submit-
ted to them, and which, if adopted, will work a change in the constitution, or which is
beyond the powers of the regular legislative body." BLACK'S LAw DicrIoNARY 1153 (6th
ed. 1990). See DANIEL PATRICK MoYNIHAN, PANDAEMONIUM 103 (1993) (discussing his-
torical perspective of plebiscite). Self-executing legislation is "[a]nything (e.g., a docu-
ment or legislation) which is effective immediately without the need of intervening
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non-binding nature of the plebiscite, the two and one-half mil-
lion Puerto Ricans residing in the continental United States and
three and one-half million Puerto Ricans residing on the island
must secure U.S. congressional legislation to enable Puerto Rico
to enact its chosen status.4
Puerto Rico's present status is a direct result of U.S. political
control of the island over the past century.5 After the Spanish-
American War,6 Spain ceded Puerto Rico to the United States in
the Treaty of Paris.7 A series of U.S. Supreme Court cases, the
Insular Cases, established Puerto Rico as an "unincorporated ter-
ritory"8 subject to the absolute will of the U.S. Congress.9 In
court action, ancillary legislation, or other type of implementing action." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1360 (6th ed. 1990). See Foster v. Nielson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253 (1829)
(discussing "self-executing" with respect to treatises). In contrast to a plebiscite which is
self-executing, the "plebiscite" held on November 14was non-binding because the cho-
sen option would not automatically go into effect without further congressional action.
Padilla, supra note 1, at 32.
4. Padilla, supra note 1, at 31; see Beth Donovan, Islanders May Soon Decide Age Old
Status Question, 47 CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 1759 (1989) [hereinafter Donovan, Age Old
Status Question] (discussing previous efforts to bring issue of Puerto Rico's status before
U.S. Congress).
5. See Treaty of Paris, Dec. 10, 1898, U.S.-Spain, art. IX, 30 Stat. 1754, 1759 (dis-
cussing transfer of Puerto Rico to United States); CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, THE
WORLD FACT BOOK 358 (1992) (listing Puerto Rico as dependent area).
6. JOHN A. GARRATv & PETER GAY, THE COLUMBIA HISTORY OF THE WORLD 932-38
(1972); R.R. PALMER & JOEL COLTON, A HISTORY OF THE MODERN WORLD SINCE 1815,
618-20 (6th ed. 1983); JAMES T. PATTERSON, AMERICA IN THE TWENTIETH CENTuR. A
HISTORY 93-94 (3rd ed. 1989). The Spanish-American War was declared against Spain
in 1898. GARRATV & GAY 932-38; PALMER & COLTON, 618-20; PATrERSON 93-94. The
causes included the desire to protect American investments of $50,000,000 in Cuba, the
public protest in the United States against the Spanish cruelties imposed upon Cuba,
the sinking of the U.S. battleship Maine in Havana Harbor, and the pro-war publica-
tions of the "Jingo Press" in the United States. GARRA-r & GAY 932-38; PALMER & Coc-
TON, 618-20; PATrERSON 93-94. The United States easily won the war and acquired Pu-
erto Rico. GARRATV & GAY 932-38. Thus the war was popularly received. Id. Neverthe-
less, there was a group of anti-imperialists who attacked it as an imperialist war.
PATTERSON 93-94. The war was ended by the Treaty of Paris of December 10, 1898.
GARRAiy & GAY 932-38; PALMER & COLTON, 618-20; PATTERSON 93-94.
7. Treaty of Paris, supra note 5, art. II, 30 Stat. at 1755.
8. Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901). The Insular Cases, a series of cases de-
cided in 1901, define the standard for determining the status of a territory of the
United States. Downes, 182 U.S. at 244; De Lima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1 (1901); Goetze v.
United States, 182 U.S. 221 (1901); Dooley v. United States, 182 U.S. 222 (1901); Arm-
strong v. United States, 182 U.S. 243 (1901); Huus v. New York & Puerto Rico Steam-
ship Co., 182 U.S. 392 (1901) [hereinafter Insular Cases]. In Downes the Supreme Court
established the doctrine of territorial incorporation. 182 U.S. at 339-41. Pursuant to
this doctrine, areas under the sovereignty of the United States that are not states fall
into two categories: incorporated and unincorporated. Id. Incorporated territories are
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1950, Congress gave Puerto Rico the opportunity to hold a plebi-
scite' 0 to adopt a Puerto Rican Constitution." Puerto Rico's
adoption of this Constitution" by referendum created a "com-
pact" governing the relationship between the United States and
Puerto Rico. 3 Thus, Puerto Rico's acceptance of the Puerto
Rico Constitution by referendum was an act of self-determina-
tion, giving democratic validity to the association between Pu-
erto Rico and the United States.14
Presently, the United States classifies Puerto Rico as a Coin-
destined to become states and are subject to the full application of the U.S. Constitu-
tion. Id. Unincorporated territories are not intended for statehood and are only sub-
ject to fundamental parts of the U.S. Constitution. Id. 268, 339-41. See U.S. v. Verdugo-
Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 268-69 (1990) (stating that only fundamental constitutional
rights apply in unincorporated territories); Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 304, 312-
13 (1922) (stating that jury trial for criminal and civil cases do not apply to unincorpo-
rated territory).
9. Dowines, 182 U.S. at 268. As determined by the Court in Downes, Congress has
plenary power to rule over territories through the Territorial Clause of the U.S. Consti-
tution. Id. Artice IV of the U.S. Constitution states: "The Congress shall have Power to
dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or
other Property belonging to the United States; and nothing in this Constitution shall be
so construed as to Prejudice any Claims of the United States, or of any particular State."
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
10. See supra note 3 (discussing nature of plebiscite).
11. RAYMOND CARR, PUERTO RiCO: A COLONAL EXPERIMENT 76 (1984).
12. PUERTO Rico CONST. The U.S. Congress approved the Puerto Rico Constitu-
tion on July 25, 1952. Pub. L. No. 447 of July 3, 1952, ch. 567, 66 Stat. 327 (1952)
(codified as amended at 48 U.S.C. §§ 731-916 (1988 & Supp. III 1991)).
13. CARR, supra note 11, at 77-78. The "compact" is an ambiguous term used to
describe the U.S.-Puerto Rico relationship. Id. The U.S. Supreme Court discussed the
compact as follows:
It may be that the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico-"El Estado Libre Asociado
de Puerto Rico" in the Spanish version-organized as a body politic by the
people of Puerto Rico under their own constitution, pursuant to the terms of
the compact offered to them in Pub. L. 600, and by them accepted, is a
State.... [However,] Puerto Rico has thus not become a State in the federal
Union like the 48 States, but it would seem to have become a State within a
common and accepted meaning of the word .... It is a political entity created
by the act and with consent of the people of Puerto Rico and joined in union
with the United States of America under the terms of the compact.
Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 672 (1974) (quoting Mora v.
Mejias, 206 F.2d 377, 387 (1st Cir. 1953)). Some commentators, however, view the U.S.-
Puerto Rico relationship as a congressionally-dictated relationship. Jos6 A. Cabranes,
Puerto Rico and the Constitution, Address Before the Judicial Conference of the First
Circuit (Sept. 1986), reprinted in 110 F.R.D. 475, 481 (1985) [hereinafter Cabranes, First
Circuit Address].
14. Letter from Hector Rivera Cruz to Linda G. Morra (Jan. 14, 1991), in U.S.
GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, U.S. INSULAR AREAS: APPLICABILITY OF RELEVANT PROVI-
SIONS OF THE U.S. CONsTrrtrION 82-84 (1991) [hereinafter Rivera Cruz Letter]; CARR,
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monwealth, which Puerto Ricans have translated to "Estado
Libre Asociado" ("ELA"). 1 5 Both the statehood and the inde-
pendence parties16 assail the validity of this legal-political sta-
tus.' 7 Some view the establishment of the ELA as a valid exercise
in self-determination" enabling Puerto Ricans to create a "free
associated territory,"1 9 a status recognized by the United Nations
supra note 11, at 77; Arnold Leibowitz, The Commonwealth of Puerto Rico: Trying To Gain
Dignity and Maintain Culture, 17 REv. JUR. U.I.P.R. 1, 20-22, (1982).
15. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, U.S. INSULAR AREAS: APPLICABILITY OF RELE.
VANT PROVISIONS OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 53 (1991) [hereinafter US GAO REPORT];
Jon M. Van Dyke, The Evolving Legal Relationships Between The United States and Its Affili-
ated U.S.-Fag Islands, 14 U. HAw. L. REv. 445, 450-51 (1992); MARTINDALE HUBBELL
UNITED STATES LAW DIGEST PR 1 (1993). The ELA/Commonwealth is described in
Martindale Hubbell Law Digest as follows:
[The] Commonwealth of Puerto Rico is populated substantially by U.S. citi-
zens, uses U.S. currency, U.S. mail, has U.S. Customs, and in general has the
appearance of a State of the Union, with a Governor and a legislature elected
by popular suffrage, a system of Commonwealth courts and other parapherna-
lia familiar in respective States. However, Puerto Rico is not a State and its
inhabitants cannot vote in national elections and are not represented in Con-
gress, except by a Resident Commisioner with a voice in House of Representa-
tives but no vote.... Bona fide residents of Puerto Rico for an entire taxable
year are exempted from U.S. income tax for such year on income derived
from sources within Puerto Rico, but are not otherwise exempted from U.S.
income tax.
Id. The ELA literally translates to "free associated state." CARR, supra note 11, at 3-4.
16. Proposed Legislation to Authorize a Political Status Referendum in Puerto Rico Over-
sight Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Insular and International Affairs of the Committee on
Interior and Insular Affairs House of Representatives, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. pt. II, 16, 100
(1990) [hereinafter Proposed Legislation]. There are three main political parties in Pu-
erto Rico. While the Partido Nuevo Progresista ("PNP") wants statehood, the Partido
Independentista Puertorriqueno ("PIP") desires independence and the Partido Popu-
lar Democratico ("PPD") seeks an enhanced Commonwealth status. Donovan, Age Old
Status Question, supra note 4, at 1759. Although the type of change desired varies ac-
cording to political party affiliation, all three political parties call for change. Id.
17. UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY, SPECIAL COMMITTEE. ON THE SITUATION
WITH REGARD To THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DECLARATION OF THE GRANTING OF
INDEPENDENCE To COLONIAL COUNTRIES AND PEOPLES: VERBATIM RECORD OF THE 1390TH
MEETING SPECIAL COMMITTEE DECISION OF 15TH AUGUST 1990 CONCERNING PUERTO RICO
CONTINUED, U.N. Doc. A/AC.109/PV 1390 at 9-10 (1991) [hereinafter U.N. Doc. A/
AC.109/PV 1390] (Rosello statement discussing colonial status); SURENDRA BHANA, THE
UNITED STATES AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE PUERTO RICAN STATUS QUESTION, 1936-
1968 130-32 (1975) (discussing estadistas' [statehood party's] and independentistas' [inde-
pendence party's] opposition to the compact); see supra note 16 (discussing three main
political parties and their platforms).
18. CARR, supra note 11, at 77; see Rivera Cruz Letter, supra note 14, at 82-84 (dis-
cussing validity of compact governing P.R-U.S. relationship and Puerto Rico's new gov-
ernmental structure); see Proposed Legislation, supra note 16, pt. II, at 16-19 (statement of
Resident Commisioner Jaime Fuster) (discussing validity of Commonwealth status).
19. ArthurJ. Armstrong, Strategic Underpinnings of the Legal Regime of Free Association:
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Decolonizing Committee.2" Other commentators contend that
the present Commonwealth merely camouflages Puerto Rico's
colonial status.2' These disparate interpretations regarding Pu-
erto Rico's status underscores the need to address this issue.22
The Negotiations for the Future Political Status of Micronesia, 7 BROOKLYNJ. INT'L. L. 179, 182
(1981). A Free Associated Territory:
differs from [an independent one] in that one of the parties to the bilateral
agreement willingly binds itself, by its own constitutional process... to cede to
the other a fundamental sovereign authority and responsibility for the con-
duct of its own affairs. Specifically, this distinction is exemplified by the reser-
vation to the United States of plenary defense authority... Free Association
is distinguished from integration into a metropolitan power by the retention
by the freely associated government of the power to assert itself domestically
and internationally without referance to the legal authority of another state.
Id.
20. G.A. Res. 748, U.N. GAOR, 8th Sess., Supp. No. 17, at 25, U.N. Doc. A/2630
(1953). In 1961, the Assembly established the Special Committee to implement the
Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.
UNITED NATIONS DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC INFORMATION, BASIC FACTS ABOUT THE UNITED
NATIONS 163 (1989).
21. CARR, supra note 11, at 81; Cabranes, First Circuit Address, supra note 13, at
481; Jos6 A. Cabranes, Puerto Rico Out of the Colonial Closet, 33 FOREIGN POL'v 66-91
(1978) [hereinafter Cabranes, Colonial Closet]; Van Dyke, supra note 15, at 514-15 (dis-
cussing Puerto Rico's lack of representation in U.S. Congress and equating status to
classical colonial situation); Guillermo Moscoso, Quo vadis, ELA?, SAN JUAN STAR, Dec.
12, 1992, at 35 [hereinafter Moscoso, Quo Vadis]; U.N. Doc. A/AC.109/PV 1390, supra
note 17, at 46 (statement of Zaida Hernindez Torres) (discussing P.R's colonial status
and failure of bilateral pact).
22. See Pallid Promises to Puerto Rico, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6, 1990, at A22 (discussing
U.S. policy of decolonization and criticising U.S. actions). The need to resolve the issue
of Puerto Rico's status is evident in light of the United States' policy of decolonization
and the criticism waged against the United States for failing to resolve Puerto Rico's
status. Id. ALVIN Z. RUBINSTEIN & GEORGE GINSBURGS, SOVIET & AMERICAN POLICIES IN
THE UNITED NATIONS: A TwENY-FIVtE YEAR PERSPECTIVE 84-90 (1971). The U.S. policy of
decolonization is demonstrated by the U.S. actions in the United Nations.
In 1945 both the Soviet Union and the United States had regarded
decolonization not only as inevitable, but also as desirable, and both favored
the U.N.'s involvement in the process. In the twenty-five years that followed,
they continued to share these broad general assumptions, and as the record
has demonstrated, their policies generally were based on them.
Id.; see Pallid Promises to Puerto Rico, supra, at A22 (discussing U.S. policy of decoloniza-
tion and criticising U.S. actions). Furthermore, this issue is pressing insofar as Puerto
Rico's Commonwealth status has been used as a precedent for other U.S. territories.
See, e.g., INTERNATIONAL LAw 435-40 (Barry E. Carter & Philip R. Trimble eds., 1991).
Arguably, the commonwealth status has also been used in determining the status of the
Northern Mariana Islands. Id.; Leibowitz, supra note 14, at 1; see also Guillermo Mos-
coso, Facts on the Pacific island republics, SAN JUAN STAR, Nov. 6, 1991, at 16 [hereinafter
Moscoso, Pacific Islands] (discussing government of Pacific Island republics); Moscoso,
Quo Vadis, supra note 21, at 35 (discussing attacks on United States for Puerto Rico's
colonial status).
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This Note argues that the establishment of the Common-
wealth government fails to fulfill the requirements of a free asso-
ciated territory as detailed in United Nations General Assembly
Resolutions 742 ("Resolution 742") and 1541 ("Resolution
1541")23 because the Puerto Rico Constitution remains subject
to the Territorial Clause of the U.S. Constitution.2 4 The Territo-
rial Clause gives the U.S. Congress plenary authority to govern
territories of the United States.2 1 Part I of this Note introduces
the factual and legal background of Puerto Rico's hybrid legal
status. Part II describes the different interpretations regarding
the validity of Puerto Rico's status in international law. Part III
argues that the present status of Puerto Rico requires that the
U.S. Congress enact legislation that allows a binding plebiscite to
define the status of Puerto Rico in a manner consistent with
U.N. General Assembly Resolutions 742 and 1541.26 Finally, this
Note concludes that the U.S. Congress should act to prevent the
continuation of a system of government where unequal treat-
ment of U.S. citizens in Puerto Rico is allowed under the U.S.
Congress' plenary power to administer territories.
I. THE LEGAL AND FACTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR PUERTO
RICO'S HYBRD LEGAL STATUS
The actions of the United States between 1898 and 1952
shaped Puerto Rico's current political status. 7 In the United
States, the Insular Cases28 of 1901 set the U.S. Constitutional
23. See G.A. Res. 648, U.N. GAOR, 7th Sess., Supp. No. 20 at 33, U.N. Doc. A/2361
(1952); G.A. Res. 742, U.N. GAOR, 8th Sess., Supp. No. 17, U.N. Doc. A/2630 (1953);
G.A. Res. 1541, U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/4684 (1960). These
General Assembly resolutions, which act as persuasive authority, set forth guidelines for
a free associated territory. BAsic FACTS ABOUT UNITED NATIONS, supra note 20, at 4.
24. Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901); U.S. GAO REPORT, supra note 15, at
29; Rafael P6rez-Bachs, Applicability of the United States Constitution and Federal Laws
to the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Remarks Before the Judicial Conference of the
First Circuit, reprinted in 110 F.R.D. 485, 486 (1986). See supra note 9 and accompanying
text (discussing Territorial Clause).
25. Downes, 182 U.S. at 268. U.N. Doc.A/AC.109/PV 1390, supra note 17, at 52-
75; P&ez-Bachs, supra note 24, at 486. See supra note 9 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing Territorial Clause).
26. G.A. Res. 742, supra note 23; G.A. Res. 1541, supra note 23.
27. See Treaty of Paris, supra note 5, art. II, 30 Stat. at 1755 (discussing transfer of
Puerto Rico to United States); THE WORLD FACT BOOK, supra note 5, at 358 (listing
Puerto Rico as dependent area of United States).
28. See supra note 8 (discussing Insular Cases).
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framework for the treatment of U.S. territories. 29  Following
the Insular Cases, a series of U.S. congressional acts modified Pu-
erto Rico's internal government and relationship with the
United States 30  These congressional statutes gradually in-
creased Puerto Rico's local autonomy.3 1 Congress' statutory
treatment culminated in the adoption of a Puerto Rican Consti-
tution and the establishment of the ELA.32 In 1953, the United
Nations qualified Puerto Rico as a self-governing territory in ac-
cordance with General Assembly Resolution 748.11 In addition,
several other General Assemby resolutions contain detailed pro-
visions that establish how a territory becomes self-governing.3 4
Puerto Ricans have subsequently revisited the issue of Puerto
Rico's status in 1967, 1989, and 1993.32
A. Puerto Rico and the Constitutional Framework for Treatment of
U.S. Territories
In 1898, Spain ceded Puerto Rico to the United States in
the Treaty of Paris36 to compensate the United States for ex-
29. Van Dyke, supra note 15, at 449-50.
30. The Foraker Act of Apr.. 12, 1900, ch. 191, 31 Stat. 77 (1900), amended by ch.
145, 39 Stat. 951 (1917);Jones Act of Mar. 2, 1917, ch. 145, 39 Stat. 951 (1917), amended
in part by ch. 490, 61 Stat. 770 (1947), and amended in part by ch. 446, 64 Stat. 319
(1950); Puerto Rico Elective Governor Act, ch. 490, 61 Stat. 770 (1947); Puerto Rico
Federal Relations Act , ch. 446, 64 Stat. 319 (1950) [hereinafter Public Law 600], as
amended by 48 U.S.C. §§ 731-916; Public Law No. 447. of July 3, 1952, ch. 567, 66 Stat.
327 (1952) (codified as amended at 48 U.S.C. §§ 731-916 (1988 & Supp. III 1991)).
31. See supra note 30 (discussing legislative history of U.S.-Puerto Rico relations).
32. See supra note 15 and accompanying text (discussing Commonwealth/ELA gov-
ernment).
33. G.A. Res. 748, supra note 20, 5. The U.N. General Assembly maintained that:
in the framework of their Constitution and of the compact agreed upon with
the United States of America, the people of the Commonwealth of Puerto
-v Rico have been invested with attributes of political sovereignty which clearly
identify the status of self-governemnt attained by the Puerto Rican people as
that of an autonomous political entity.
Id.
\ 34. G.A. Res. 648, supra note 23, Annex; G.A. Res. 742, supra note 23, Annex; G.A.
Res. 1541, supra note 23, Annex.
35. JUAN R. TORRUELLA, THE SUPREME COURT AND PUERTO Rico: THE DOCTRINE OF
SEPARATE AND UNEQUAL 129-30, 199 (1985) (discussing 1967 plebiscite results); Van
Dyke, supra, note 15, at 447; Donovan, Age Old Status Question, supra note 4, at 1759
(discussing 1989-91 efforts to secure self-executing bill to implement chosen status op-
tions); Padilla, supra note I (discussing 1993 plebiscite on Puerto Rico's status).
36. Treaty of Paris, supra note 5, art. II, 30 Stat. at 1755; U.S. GAO REPORT, supra
note 15, at 43. Other territories that came ,under the United States power include:
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penses incurred during the Spanish-American War .3 The
Treaty of Paris provided that the U.S. Congress would determine
the civil rights and political status of the native inhabitants of
Puerto Rico. 8 Pursuant to the treaty, Congress passed the
Foraker Act in 1900.39 The Foraker Act terminated the military
administration in Puerto Rico, temporarily provided revenues,
and established an interim civil government.4 ° The Foraker Act,
however, neither incorporated Puerto Rico nor granted Puerto
Ricans the political and civil rights possessed by citizens of the
United States.41
1. The Insular Cases
In the Insular Cases,42 a series of cases decided by the U.S.
Supreme Court in 1901, the Court addressed the territorial sta-
tus of Puerto Rico.43 The Court determined that Article IV, sec-
tion 3, clause 2 of the U.S. Constitution,44 commonly referred to
as the Territorial Clause, grants the U.S. Congress plenary au-
thority over territories of the United States. 4' Furthermore, the
Insular Cases46 distinguished between incorporated and unincor-
porated territories, 47 defining the standard for determining the
Cuba, Guam, and the Phillipines. Treaty of Paris, supra note 5, arts. Il-II1, 30 Stat. at
1755.
37. CARR, supra note 11, at 22; TORRUELIA, supra note 35, at 17.
38. Treaty of Paris, supra note 5, art. IX, 30 Stat. at 1759.
39. The Foraker Act, 31 Stat. at 77.
40. The Foraker Act, 31 Stat. at 79-86.
41. TORRUELLA, supra note 35, at 36. For example, residents of Puerto Rico were
not given U.S. citizenship or the right to vote for representatives to the U.S. govern-
ment. Id. at 36-39.
42. Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901); De Lima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1 (1901);
Goetze v. United States, 182 U.S. 221 (1901); Dooley v. United States, 182 U.S. 222
(1901); Armstrong v. United States, 182 U.S. 243 (1901); Huus v. New York & Puerto
Rico Steamship Co., 182 U.S. 392 (1901); Pepke v. United States, 183 U.S. 176 (1901).
43. Downes, 182 U.S. at 247; Del Valle, Puerto Rico Before the United States Supreme
Court, 19 REv. JUR. U.I.P.R 13, 29-30 (1984).
44. U.S. CoNs'r. art. IV, § 3; see supra note 9 and accompanying text (discussing
Territorial Clause).
45. Dounes, 182 U.S. at 267-68. The Court stated that "the power of Congress over
the territories of the United States is general and plenary." Id. ,
46. See supra note 8 and accompanying text (discussing Insular Cases that set stan-
dard for determining status of U.S. territories: Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901);
De Lima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1 (1901); Goetze v. United States, 182 U.S. 221 (1901);
Dooley v. United States, 182 U.S. 222 (1901); Armstrong v. United States, 182 U.S. 243
(1901); Huus v. New York & Puerto Rico Steamship Co., 182 U.S. 392 (1901)).
47. See supra note 8 and accompanying text (discussing doctrine of territorial in-
corporation).
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status of a territory of the United States.48
In DeLima v. Bidwell,49 an action to recover duties paid on
goods imported from Puerto Rico into New York, the U.S. cus-
toms collector contended that Puerto Rico was a foreign country
within the meaning of the tariff laws."0 U.S Supreme Court Jus-
tice Henry Billings Brown reasoned that treaties made under the
authority of the United States are the supreme law of the land
under Article VI,51 and that the U.S. possesses the power to ac-
quire territory either by conquest or by treaty.5 2 Relying on the
Dred Scott case, 3 Justice Brown stated that the right to acquire
territory included the right to govern and dispose of it.54 Once
acquired by treaty, the territory belonged to the United States
and was subject to the disposition of the U.S. Congress. 5 Ac-
cordingly, ratification of the Treaty of Paris made Puerto Rico a
territory of the United States subject to the disposition of the
U.S. Congress. 6
In Downes v. Bidwell,"' the U.S. Supreme Court established
the doctrine of territorial incorporation.5 8 Pursuant to this doc-
trine, areas under the sovereignty of the United States that were
not states fell into two categories, incorporated and unincorpo-
rated territories.5 " Incorporated territories included those terri-
48. Downes, 182 U.S. at 339; Van Dyke, supra note 15, at 459-60.
49. 182 U.S. 1 (1901).
50. Id. at 1-2.
51. Id. at 194. Article VI of the U.S. Constitution states: "This Constitution, and
the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Trea-
ties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be
the supreme law of the Land. . . ." U.S. CONsr. art. VI, § 2.
52. De Lima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1, 195 (1901).
53. Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. 393, 395 (1857). In Dred Scott, the U.S. Supreme
Court held that Scott, a slave, was neither a citizen of Missouri nor a citizen of the
United States and had no constitutional rights to sue in Federal Courts. Id. The Court
also maintained that the U.S. Congress may legislate over territories within the scope of
its constitutional powers. Id.
54. De Lima, 182 U.S. at 196.
55. Id. at 197.
56. Id. at 196-197.
57. 182 U.S. 244 (1901).
58. Id. at 339.
59. Id. The Court explained the doctrine of territorial incorporation as follows:
[t]he treaty-making power cannot incorporate territory into the United States
without the express or implied assent of Congress, that it may insert in a treaty
conditions against immediate incorporation, and that on the other hand when
it has expressed in the treaty the conditions favorable to incorporation, they
will, if the treaty be not repudiated by Congress, have the force of the law of
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tories that would become states and thus were subject to the full
application of the U.S. Constitution.6 ° Unincorporated territo-
ries, by contrast, were those territories that were not intended
for statehood and were only subject to fundamental parts of the
U.S. Constitution.61
In Downes,6 2 the Supreme Court addressed the applicability
of the U.S. Constitution to territories of the United States. The
Court reasoned that under the Territorial Clause of the U.S.
Constitution, the U.S. Congress had plenary authority over U.S.
territories.6" The U.S. Congress' authority arose from, and was
incidental to, the U.S. right to acquire territory and make all
needful rules respecting territory belonging to the United
States.64 The Court maintained that the U.S. Constitution ap-
plied to territories only when Congress explicitly provided.65
The Court stated, however, that fundamental limitations in favor
of personal rights always applied to the territories by inference
and the general spirit of the Constitution.66 Citing constitu-
the land, and therefore by the fulfillment of such conditions cause incorpora-
tion to result. It must follow, therefore, that where a treaty contains no condi-
tions for incorporation, and, above all, where it not only has no such condi-
tions but expressly provides to the contrary, incorporation does not arise until
in the wisdom of Congress it is deemed that the acquired territory has reached
that state where it is proper that it should enter into and form a part of the
American family.
Id.
60. Downes, 182 U.S. at 339.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 244.
63. Doumwes, 182 U.S. at 268. The court stated:
The power of Congress over the territories of the United States is general and
plenary, arising from and incidental to the right to acquire territory itself, and
from the power given by the Constitution to make all needful rules and regula-
tions respecting the territory or other other property belonging to the United
States. ,
Id.; see Van Dyke, supra note 15, at 453-59 (discussing Supreme Court's interpretation
of U.S. Congress' plenary authority over territories).
64. Downes, 182 U.S. at 268.
65. Id.
66. Id. The Court stated:
Doubtless Congress, in legislating for the territories would be subject to those
fundamental limitations in favor of personal rights which are formulated in
the Constitution and its amendments; but these limitations would exist rather
by inference and the general spirit of the Constitution from which Congress
derives all its powers, than by any express and direct application of its provi-
sions.
Id.; see U.S. v. Verdugo-Urguidez, 494 U.S. 259, 268-69 (1990) (stating that only "funda-
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tional silence, common practice, and congressional limits in
dealings with territories, the majority rejected the notion that
the Constitution attached to these territories as soon as they
were acquired.6 7 The Court concluded that Puerto Rico was a
territory belonging to the United States,6 and that Article I, sec-
tion 8, clause 1 of the U.S. Constitution, requiring uniform du-
ties throughout the United States, was not a fundamental provi-
sion and did not apply to Puerto Rico.69
Justice Edward Douglass White's concurrence in Downes has
emerged as the prevalent rule of the Insular Cases.70 Justice
White maintained that, in the case of territories, the Constitu-
tion was always operative. 7' The question with respect to territo-
ries was whether a particular constitutional provision applied.
72
In the case of Puerto Rico, the Treaty of Paris failed to provide
for incorporation. 73  Instead, the Treaty of Paris explicitly de-
ferred the determination of the status of the territories to the
mental" constitutional rights apply in unincorporated territories); Dorr v. U.S., 195 U.S.
138, 149 (1904) (stating that U.S. Constitution does not, without legislation of its own
force, carry such right to territory); Van Dyke, supra note 15, at 459-68 (discussing na-
ture of fundamental rights).
67. Downes, 182 U.S. at 286. The Court stated:
The liberality of Congress in legislating the Constitution into all our contigu-
ous territories has undoubtedly fostered the impression that it went there by
its own force, but there [is] nothing in the Constitution itself, and little in the
interpretation put upon it, to confirm that impression. In short, there is abso-
lute silence upon the subject. The executive and legislative departments of
the government have for more than a century interpreted this silence as pre-
cluding the idea that the Constitution attached to these territories as soon as
acquired, and unless such interpretation be manifestly contrary to the letter or
spirit of the Constitution, it should be followed by the judicial department.
Id.
68. Id. at 287.
69.Jd. at 278-80.
70. Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 305 (1922); TORRUELLA, supra note 35, at
53.,
71. Downes, 182 U.S. at 292 (White,J, concurring). The White concurrence stated
that "[iun the case of territories, as in every other instance, when a provision of the
Constitution is invoked, the question which arises is, not whether the Constitution is
operative, for that is self-evident, but whether the provision relied on is applicable." Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 340. Justice White stated: "It is to me obvious that the above quoted
provisions of the treaty do not stipulate for incorporation, but, on the contrary, ex-
pressly provide that the civil rights and political status of the native inhabitants of the
territories hereby ceded shall be determined by Congress." Id; see Treaty of Paris, supra
note 5, 30 Stat. at 1759 (failing to provide for incorporation of Puerto Rico).
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U.S. Congress.74 Therefore, although Puerto Rico was an unin-
corporated territory, the U.S. Constitution did apply.75 Accord-
ingly, Puerto Rico was not a separate country in an international
sense as it was subject to the sovereignty of, and owned by, the
United States.76 Puerto Rico was, however, foreign to the United
States in the domestic sense, because it had not been incorpo-
rated into the United States, but was merely a possession. 77 Jus-
tice White relied heavily on the explicit terms of the Treaty of
Paris to distinguish territories acquired under the Treaty of Paris
from other territories that had received explicit promises for
eventual statehood.78
74. Domnes, 182 U.S. at 340 (White,J., concurring); Treaty of Paris, supra note 5, 30
Stat. at 1759.
75. Downes, 182 U.S. at 292 (White, J., concurring).
76. Id. at 341. Justice White stated:
Since it has been decided that incorporation flows from a treaty which pro-
vides for that result, when its provisions have been expressly or impliedly ap-
proved by Congress, it must follow that the same effect flows from a treaty
which expressly stipulates to the contrary, even although [sic] the condition to
that end has been approved by Congress. That is to say, the argument is this:
Because a provision for incorporation when ratified incorporates, therefore a
provision against incorporation must also produce the very consequence
which it expressly provides against.
The result of what has been said is that while in an international sense
Porto Rico was not a foreign country, since it was subject to the sovereignty of
and was owned by the United States, it was foreign to the United States in a
domestice sense, because the island had not been incorporated into the
United States, but was merely appurtenant thereto as a possesion.
Id. at 341-42.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 341; Treaty of Paris, supra note 5, art. I, 30 Star. at 1755. A cursory survey
of other territories that came under United States power at this time, specifically Cuba,
Guam, the Philippines, and Hawaii, reveals divergent political paths. See Treaty of Paris,
supra note 5, arts. I-III, 30 Stat. at 1755-56 (providing for U.S. control of Cuba, Guam
and Phillipines); Newlands Resolution, No. 55, 30 Stat. 750 (1898) (bringing Hawaii
under power of United States); U.S. GAO REPORT, supra note 15, at 49- (discussing
Guam's current political status); Act of Independence, No. 24, 48 Stat. 1682 (1934)
(providing independence for Cuba); Act of July 4, 1946, ch. 84, 48 Stat. 456 (1946)
(providing for independent Republic of Philippines); Hawaii Statehood Act, Pub. L.
No. 86-3, 73 Stat. 4 (1959) (providing statehood for Hawaii). Article 1 of the Treaty Qf
Paris provided that "Spain relinquishe [d] all claim of sovereignty over the title to Cuba"
and names the United States as the occupying power. Treaty of Paris, supra note 5, art.
I, 30 Stat. at 1755. After a short period of military governments in Cuba under the
United States trusteeship, a civil government was established. GAtaxrv & GAY, supra
note 6, at 937. Through the Platt Amendment, which Cuba had to add to its Constitu-
tion before the United States would recognize its independence, the United States was
allowed to interfere with the governing affairs of Cuba. The Platt Amendment, 33 Stat.
2248 (1903). In 1934, the United States abrogated the Platt Amendment, effectively
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In Balzac v. Porto Rico,79 decided twenty-one years after the
Insular Cases, the U.S. Supreme Court unanimously adopted the
incorporation doctrine.8" Balzac involved the existence of a con-
stitutional right to a jury trial in Puerto Rico.81 The Court held
that U.S. legislation regarding Puerto Rico did not incorporate
Puerto Rico into the United States.12 In passing the Jones Act,8"
which established a system of local government in Puerto Rico,
making Cuba politically independent. Act of Independence, No. 24, 48 Stat. 1682
(1934).
Article II of the Treaty of Paris provided for the cession of both Guam and Puerto
Rico to the United States. Treaty of Paris, supra note 5, art. II, 30 Stat. at 1755. Guam,
like Puerto Rico, became an unincorporated U.S. territory. The Organic Act of Guam,
ch. 512, 64 Stat. 384 (1950). The U.S. Congress passed the Organic Act of Guam, which
granted Guamanians U.S. citizenship, established a bill of rights and a three-branch
government, vested executive authority in a Presidentially-appointed governor, and de-
fined the island as an unincorporated territory. Id. In 1968, the Organic Act was
amended to provide for popular election of a governor. Guam Elective Governor Act,
Pub. L. No. 90-497, 82 Stat. 842 (1968). In 1972 Guam was granted the right to elect a
non-voting delegate to the U.S. House of Representatives. Act of Apr. 10, 1972, Pub. L.
No. 92-271, 86 Stat. 118 (1972).
Article III of the Treaty of Paris provided for the cession of the Philippine Islands
to the United States for the sum of U.S.$20 million. Treaty of Paris, supra note 5, art.
III, 30 Stat. at 1755-56. In 1902, the U.S. Congress provided for a temporary govern-
ment in the Philippines. Administration of Philippine Government Act, ch. 1369, 32
Stat. 691 (1902). Id. By 1902, the Supreme Court deemed the Philippines an unincor-
porated territory. Pepke v. United States, 183 U.S. 176 (1901). In 1916, the Jones Act
clarified the U.S. intention to grant independence to the Philippines. Philippine Au-
tonomy Act, ch. 416, 39 Stat. 545 (1916). The Tydings-McDuffie Act of 1934 set the
date of independence at 1946 following a transition period under a commonwealth
government. Tydings-McDuffie Act, ch. 11, 47 Stat. 761 (1933), amended by Philippine
Independence Act, ch. 84, 48 Stat. 456. The independent Republic of the Philippines
was inaugurated on July 4, 1946. Philippine Independence Act, ch. 84, 48 Stat. 456
(1946).
Another territory that came under U.S. dominion during the Spanish-American
War was Hawaii. Newlands Resolution, No. 55, 30 Stat. 750 (1898). The Newlands
Resolution provided for annexation of the territory of Hawaii "as part of the territory of
the United States." Id. Thus, the Newlands Resolution deemed Hawaii, unlike Puerto
Rico, an incorporated territory providing for its eventual attainment of statehood. See
Act of Apr. 3, 1900, ch. 339, 31 Stat. 141 (1900) (providing for incorporated status);
TORRUELLA, supra note 35, at 66-68. In 1947 the House of Representatives passed legis-
lation approving statehood for Hawaii, yet the Senate rejected the House bill. State-
hood was eventually granted to Hawaii on March 18, 1959, effective Aug. 21, 1959, two
months after statehood was granted to Alaska. Hawaii Statehood Act of Mar. 18, 1959,
Pub. L. No. 86-3, 73 Stat. 4 (1959).
79. 258 U.S. 298 (1922).
80. See supra notes 57-61 and accompanying text (discussing incorporation doc-
trine).
81. 258 U.S. at 300.
82. Id. at 313. The Court stated: "On the whole, therefore, we find no features in
the Organic Act of Porto Rico of 1917 from which we can infer the purpose of Congress
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and in granting Puerto Ricans U.S. citizenship, the U.S. Con-
gress did not incorporate Puerto Rico.84 The Court stated that
to incorporate Puerto Rico Congress must do so explicitly,
rather than merely inferring it.85 The Court reasoned that none
of the U.S. Congress' acts had explicitly incorporated Puerto
Rico into the United States. 6 The Court concluded that the
right to trial by jury7 did not apply to territories not incorpo-
rated in the United States and, therefore, did not apply to Pu-
erto Rico without explicit congressional action.88
2. Statutory Treatment of Puerto Rico Prior to 1950
The U.S. Congress passed the Foraker Act in 1900 in order
to establish a system of local government in Puerto Rico.89
Although the Foraker Act did not incorporate Puerto Rico nor
grant Puerto Ricans U.S. citizenship,90 it did grant Puerto Ri-
cans entitlement to U.S. protection.9" The Foraker Act also es-
tablished a system of local government consisting of a gover-
nor,92 an executive council (the upper house of the Puerto Rico
Congress)," justices of the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico,94 and
the judge for the newly created United States District Court, all
of whom were appointed by the U.S. President.95 Puerto Ricans
elected members of the lower house, known as the House of Del-
to incorporate Porto Rico into the United States with the consequences which would
follow." Id.
83. 54 CONG. REC. 4810, ch. 145, 39 Stat. 951 (1917). TheJones Act, passed by the
U.S. Congress in 1917, provided Puerto Rico with a new governmental framework and
its residents with U.S. citizenship. 54 CONG. REc. 1324-29, 2162-64, 2221-23, 2248-65,
3005-11, 3069-74, 3467-79, 3666-67 (1917).
84. Balzac, 258 U.S. at 305.
85. Id. at 306. "Had Congress intended to take the important step of changing the
treaty status of Porto Rico by incorporating it into the Union, it is reasonable to suppose
that it would have done so by plain declaration, and would not have left it to mere
inference." Id.
86. 258 U.S. at 313.
87. See U.S. CONST. amend. VII. The Seventh amendment to the U.S. Constitution
provides: "[i] n Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty
dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved." Id.
88. Balzac, 258 U.S. at 304-05.
89. The Foraker Act, 31 Stat. at 77; Balzac, 258 U.S. at 305-06.
90. The Foraker Act, 31 Stat. at 79; Balzac, 258 U.S. at 305-06.
91. 31 Stat. at 79.
92. Id. at 81.
93. Id. at 79-81.
94. Id. 84-85.
95. Id. at 82-84; TORRUELLA, supra note 35, at 39 n.164.
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egates. 96 Any legislation had to pass both chambers and the gov-
ernor's veto.97 Thus, the Foraker Act established a framework
that precluded any legislation contrary to American interests.98
During the next fifty years the U.S. Congress gradually en-
hanced Puerto Rico's local autonomy.99 The U.S. Congress
paved the way for a more permanent union between Puerto Rico
and the United States with the passage of the Jones Act of
1917.100 The Jones Act granted Puerto Ricans U.S. citizenship,
unless the Puerto Rican resident specifically rejected such citi-
zenship.10 1 The Jones Act also altered the structure of the civil
government by authorizing a popularly-elected bicameral legisla-
ture. 0 2 The U.S. President, however, continued to appoint the
governor, the attorney general, and the justices of the Supreme
Court of Puerto Rico. 10 3 The Jones Act also provided that the
statutory laws of the United States had the same force and effect
in Puerto Rico as in the United States, with the exception of the
internal revenue laws and other laws the U.S. Congress deemed
inapplicable.104 Furthermore, the Jones Act included a bill of
rights similar to that contained in the U.S. Constitution.0 5
Thirty years later, the U.S. Congress passed the Puerto Rico
96. The Foraker Act, 31 Stat. at 82-83.
97. Id. at 81, 83.
98. See id. at 83 (discussing U.S. Congress' power to annul laws); CARR, supra note
11, at 36-37 (maintaining that Foraker Act precluded Puerto Rico legislation contrary to
U.S. interests).
99. See, e.g., C A, supra note 11, at 147-82 (discussing increasing self-government
to Puerto Rico culminating in adoption of Puerto Rico Constitution); United States v.
Sanchez, 992 F.2d 1143, 1151 (llth Cir. 1993) (discussing Puerto Rico's increasingly
independent authority over local affairs in years leading up to 1950).
100. The Jones Act, 39 Stat. at 951. TORRUELLA, supra note 35, at 85-87. During the
period 1900 to 1917, twenty-one bills were presented for the purpose of granting Puerto
Ricans citizenship. TORRUELLA, supra note 35, at 85. During this period Puerto Rico
had nearly one million inhabitants and increasing business and trade interests with the
United States. Id. at 86. Furthermore, the Republic of Panama became a protectorate
of the United States and the Panama Canal was constructed thereby enhancing Puerto
Rico's strategic importance to the United States. Id. at 86-87.
101. The Jones Act, 39 Stat. at 953.
102. Id. at 958-59.
103. Id. at 955-56, 965.
104. Id. at 954; see 48 U.S.C. § 734 (1988). Today 48 U.S.C. § 734 still describes the
applicability of federal statutes to the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico as whatever is "not
locally inapplicable." Id. This has been criticized as a "blank check" for the federal
government to have the ultimate determination regarding which federal laws apply in
Puerto Rico. P6rez-Bachs, supra note 24, at 487-88.
105. The Jones Act, 39 Stat. at 951.
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Elective Governor Act (the "PREGA"),106 which permitted the
local election of a governor. 10 7 At the same time, the PREGA
provided for a federal coordinator to oversee and report to the
U.S. President on government affairs.' 08 The PREGA also ena-
bled the U.S. President to exempt Puerto Rico from any federal
law not expressly applied to Puerto Rico.109  Furthermore,
under the PREGA, the U.S. Congress could revoke the grant of
authority to self-govern in local matters. 10 The PREGA neither
provided Puerto Ricans a voting representative in the U.S. Con-
gress nor granted them the right to vote in federal elections.'
1
3. Adoption of Public Laws 600 and 447: The Establishment
of the ELA
Between 1950 and 1952, the U.S. Congress significantly
modified the status of Puerto Rico.112 By enacting Public Law
No. 600 ("Public Law 600") on July 3, 1950,113 the U.S. Congress
established the process by which residents of Puerto Rico could
organize a government under a locally designed constitution.
1 1 4
Puerto Ricans ratified Public Law 600 by a plebiscite in Puerto
Rico on June 4, 1951."1 Thereafter, a constituent assembly met
in Puerto Rico and drafted a constitution." 6 The Puerto Rico
electorate subsequently approved the Constitution on March 3,
1952.117 On July 25, 1952, via Public Law No. 447 ("Public Law
447"), the U.S. Congress approved the Puerto Rican Constitu-
tion, with alterations.' 8
106. Puerto Rico Elective Governor Act, 61 Stat. at 770.
107. Id. at 770-71.
108. Id. at 772.
109. Id. at 772.
110. BHANA, supra note 17, at 107.
111. U.S. GAO REPORT, supra note 15, at 44. Puerto Rico has a non-voting repre-
sentative in the U.S. House of Representatives. Id.
112. Pub. L. No. 600, 64 Stat. 319 (1950) [hereinafter Public Law 600]; Pub. L. No.
447, 66 Stat. 327 (1952) [hereinafter Public Law 447]. Luis Mufioz-Marm, a leading
Puerto Rican politician, campaigned for a "Pueblo Asociado de Puerto Rico" ("Associ-
ated People of Puerto Rico") that would allow Puerto Rico complete internal auton-
omy. TORRUELLA, supra note 35, at 144.
113. Public Law 600, 64 Stat. at 319.
114. Id.
115. TORRUELLA, supra note 35, at 153.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Public Law 447, 66 Stat. at 327. After the Constitution was approved in Puerto
Rico, the U.S. Congress unilaterally deleted sections 5 and 20 of the Puerto Rico Consti-
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The preamble to Public Law 600 fully recognized the princi-
ple of government by consent by stating that Public Law 600 was
adopted "in the nature of a compact."" 9 Accordingly, the
United States and the United Nations regarded Puerto Rico's
acceptance of Public Law 600 by plebiscite as an act of self-deter-
mination that gave democratic validity to Puerto Rico's associa-
tion with the United States.12 The United States contended that
Public Law 600 terminated direct U.S. administration of local
affairs in Puerto Rico and granted Puerto Rico full control over
local executive, legislative, and judicial matters. 121
4. Puerto Rico Revisits the Status Issue
Although Puerto Rico's status, as established in Public Laws
600 and 447, remains unchanged, Puerto Ricans have revisited
the status issue on several occasions.12 2 On July 23, 1967, Puerto
Ricans held a non-binding plebiscite on Puerto Rico's status.123
The Puerto Rico electorate voted 60.5% in favor of a "perfected"
commonwealth, 38.9% in favor of statehood, and 0.6% in favor
of independence.1 24 The independence movement and the offi-
cial statehood party, however, opposed the plebiscite and ab-
stained from voting.125 Despite the lack of participation by the
statehood and independence movements, 66% of the registered
voters cast their ballots in the plebiscite. 126
tution's Bill of Rights. TORRUELLA, supra note 35, at 154. Section 5 of the proposed
Puerto Rico Constitution provided for free public education, while Section 20 provided
for certain human rights, including public elementary and secondary education and
disability protection. Id. n.573; see Leibowitz, supra note 14, at 25-26 (discussing
changes to Puerto Rico Constitution).
119. Public Law 600, 64 Stat. at 319.
120. CAMR, supra note 11, at 77; G.A. Res. 748, supra note 20, at 25.
121. U.S. GAO REPORT, supra note 15, at 44. The U.S. government maintains that
Puerto Rico's adoption of the 1952 Constitution "ended direct U.S. administration of
local affairs in Puerto Rico and granted full local executive, legislative, and judicial
authority to Puerto Rico." Id.
122. TORRUELLA, supra note 35, at 129-30; Van Dyke, supra note 15, at 447; Leibo-
witz, supra note 14, at 30-31; Donovan, Age Old Status Question, supra note 4, at 1759
(discussing 1989-91 congressional hearings on Puerto Rico's status); Padilla, supra note
1, at 31 (discussing 1993 plebiscite on Puerto Rico's status).
123. TORRUELLA, supra note 35, at 129-30, 199; Leibowitz, supra note 14, at 31.
124. TORRUELLA, supra note 35, at 129-30, 199. In the 1967 plebiscite 425,079
votes favored commonwealth, while 273,315 votes favored statehood. Id. at 129-30;
Leibowitz, supra note 14, at 31 n.119; Puerto Rico Vote Strongly Favors A Commonwealth,
N.Y. TIMES, July 24, 1967, at Al.
125. TORRUELLA, supra note 35, at 129-30; Leibowitz, supra note 14, at 31 n.119.
126. TORRUELLA, supra note 35, at 129-30. Judge Torruella notes that the indepen-
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Between 1989 and 1991, the three main political parties, the
Partido Popular Democratico ("PDP"), the Partido Nuevo
Progressita ("PNP"), and the Partido Independentista Puertorri-
queno ("PIP"),121 joined together to seek congressional approval
for a plebiscite.1 2  Each of the party leaders agreed to offer vot-
ers all three options: statehood, independence, and enhanced
commonwealth status. 129 The goal was to draft a self-executing
bill that would fully and finally commit the U.S. government to
specific plans for implementation of each option.13 ° Although
the bill enabling this plebiscite in the summer of 1991 passed in
the U.S. House of Representatives on October 10, 1990,131 the
U.S. Senate voted against the bill on February 27, 1991.132
Most recently, on November 14, 1993, Puerto Ricans voted
in a non-binding plebiscite1 3 to choose among statehood, inde-
pendence, and enhanced commonwealth status options.3 4
dence movement was losing strength and that the then official statehood party, PER, no
longer represented the statehood movement. Id. After the 1967 plebiscite there
emerged a new statehood party, the PNP. Id.
127. See supra note 16 and accompanying text (discussing main political parties in
Puerto Rico). The PNP desires statehood, the PIP seeks independence, and the PPD
seeks an enhanced commonwealth status. Donovan, Age Old Status Question, supra note
4, at 1759.
128. Donovan, Age Old Status Question, supra note 4, at 1759.
129. Id. For a detailed description of the proposals for each status option, see
Beth Donovan, Senate Committee Gives Its OK To Puerto Rican Plebiscite, 47 CONG. Q. WKLv.
REP. 2152 (1989) [hereinafter Donovan, Senate Gives OK]; Van Dyke, supra note 15, at
499-501 (discussing provisions for enhanced commonwealth proposal).
130. Donovan, Senate Gives OK, supra note 129, at 2152.
131. Kitty Dumas, House Passes Puerto Rico Bill Johnston Stalls It In Senate, 48 CONG.
Q. WKLY. REP. 3413 (1990) [hereinafter Dumas, House Passes PR Bill]. House bill H.R.
4765 did not call for a binding plebiscite, but instead would have set up an expedited
procedure for the U.S. Congress to follow up on the results of the plebiscite. Id. By
contrast, the companion Senate bill, S. 712, would have been self-executing, putting
into effect immediately the status option chosen in the plebiscite. Id.
132. Kitty Dumas, Referendum Bill Appears Dead After Energy Panel Vote, 49 CONG. Q.
WK.LY. REP. 538 (1991) [hereinafter Dumas, Referendum Bill Appears Dead].
133. Padilla, supra note 1, at 31 (discussing fact that Nov. 14 plebiscite was not
really plebiscite); see supra note 3 (discussing nature of plebiscite).
134. STATE ELECTIONS COMMISSION, THESE ARE THE POLITICAL STATUS DEFINITIONS
ACCORDING TO THE PARTIES THAT PROMOTE THEM (San Juan, Puerto Rico 1993). The
PPD has defined enhanced commonwealth as follows:
A vote for the Commonwealth is a mandate in favor of:
Guaranteeing our progress and security as well as that of our children within
a status of full political dignity, based on a permanent union between Puerto
Rico and the United States, embodied in a bilateral pact that cannot be altered
except by mutual agreement.
The Commonwealth guarantees:
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Although non-binding, the purpose of this vote was to build
upon the momentum of the 1989-91 failed U.S.-Puerto Rico ne-
gotiations for a binding plebiscite and to maintain pressure on
the U.S. Congress to revisit the status issue. 13 5  The common-
wealth option received 48.6% of the votes, statehood received
46.3% of the votes, and independence 4.4% of the votes. 136 De-
spite the fact that the commonwealth option received a 2% mar-
gin over statehood, none of the options garnered a clear major-
ity.
In response to the 1993 plebiscite, U.S. President Bill Clin-
ton directed the establishment of an Inter-Agency Working
Group on Puerto Rico."3 7 This Inter-Agency Working Group will
coordinate the development and review of policy, acting as a liai-
son between the White House and the senior officials of the rele-
vant departments and agencies.1 38 The main purpose of the
Working Group is to study the 1993 plebiscite proposals.3 9
B. The United Nations on Territories and Puerto Rico
The U.N. Charter 4 ° seeks to establish a world order
modeled on the federal structure of the United States and to
ensure the collective security of its members and the rule of law
for all humankind. 4 ' Article 1 of the U.N. Charter states that
" Irrevocable U.S. citizenship;
" Common market, common currency and common defense with the United
States;
" Fiscal Autonomy for Puerto Rico;
" Puerto Rican Olympic Committee and our own international sports repre-
sentation;
" Full development of our cultural identity under Commonwealth we are Pu-
erto Rican first [sic].
Id. (emphasis added). Padilla, supra note 1, at 33; Larry Rohter, 3 Ex-Presidents Join the
Debate on Puerto Rico, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 13, 1993, at 8 [hereinafter Rohter, Three Ex-Presi-
dents]; Rohter, Puerto Rico Votes, supra note 1, at Al.
135. Padilla, supra note 1, at 31.
136. Ivonne Garcia, Final status plebiscite results released, SAN JUAN STAR, Dec. 10,
1993, at 12.
137. Letter from Marcia L. Hale, Assistant to the President and Director of Inter-
governmental Affairs, The White House, to Honorable Ron de Lugo, Chairman, Sub-
committee on Insular and International Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives 1
(March 9, 1994) (on file with the Subcommittee on Insular and International Affairs,
Washington, D.C.) [hereinafter Letter from Marcia Hale to Ron de Lugo].
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. U.N. CHARTER art. 1. The U.N. Charter established the United Nations. Id.
141. INTERNATIONAL LAw, supra note 22, at 435-40 (quoting Thomas M. Franck,
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the purpose of the United Nations includes the development of
amicable relations among nations based on the principles of
equal rights and self-determination. 14 2 To this end, Article 73
provides that members of the United Nations that assume re-
sponsibility for the administration of non-self-governing territo-
ries accept the obligation to transmit regularly to the Secretary-
General statistical and other information relating to economic,
social, and educational conditions in these territories.14 3 Article
73(b) provides that a Member nation accepts the obligation to
develop self-government in territories, to take due account of
the political aspirations of the peoples in the territories, and to
assist them in the progressive development of their free political
institutions.1 44
To guide the process of preparing a territory to attain self-
government, the General Assembly issued a series of resolu-
tions.1 45  Resolution 648 listed several factors to take into ac-
count in determining whether a territory is self-governing, in-
cluding the manifestation of the freely expressed will of the peo-
ple.1 46 Resolution 648 also laid out three alternative paths to
self-government: independence, "other separate systems of self-
government," and free association.1 47 One year later, in 1953,
Resolution 742 further clarified the list of factors to determine
whether a territory has reached a full measure of self-govern-
Soviet Initiatives: U.S. Responses-New Opportunities for Reviving the United Nations Systems, 83
AM. J. INTL. L. 531, 532 (1989)). "The Charter was touted by the Truman administra-
tion as the new global Magna Carta, which would establish a world order modeled on
the federal structure of the United States and thus ensure collective security and the
rule of law for all mankind." Id.
142. U.N. CHARTER art. 1.
143. U.N. CHARTER art. 73.
144. U.N. CHARTER art. 73(b).
145. G.A. Res. 648, supra note 23, at 33; G.A. Res. 742, supra note 23 at 21; G.A.
Res. 1541, supra note 23, at 29. Article 85 of the U.N. Charter provides that any altera-
tion or amendment to a trusteeship agreement is to be exercised by the General Assem-
bly. U.N. CHARTER art. 85. The General Assembly is one of the six principal organs of
the United Nations. BAsic FACTS ABOUT THE UNITED NATIONS, supra note 20, at 4. The
General Assembly is divided into seven main committees that submit draft resolutions
to the plenary meetings where voting occurs by simple majority. Id. at 5. The decisions
of the General Assembly "have no legally binding force for Governments," but rather
"carry the weight of world opinion on major international issues, as well as the moral
authority of the world community." Id. at 7.
146. G.A. Res. 648, supra note 23, 7(c), at 34.
147. G.A. Res. 648, supra note 23, Annex pts. I-II, at 34. These alternatives were
later developed in Resolutions 742 and 1541. G.A. Res. 742, supra note 23, at 21; G.A.
Res. 1541, supra, note 23, at 29.
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ment. 48 Building upon the three forms of self-government
listed in Resolution 648,149 Resolution 742 provided that territo-
ries could also achieve self-government by association with an-
other State or group of States if done freely and on the basis of
absolute equality.1 51
Resolution 742 also considered the constitutional frame-
work of the central authority with regard to the territory associ-
ated by treaty or bilateral agreement.' These include: (i)
whether constitutional guarantees extend equally to the associ-
ated territory; (ii) whether there are powers that are constitu-
tionally reserved to the territory or to the central authority; and
(iii) whether there is a provision for the equal participation of
the territory in any changes in the constitutional system of the
State. 15 2 Resolution 742 further noted that citizenship should be
provided without discrimination on the same basis as other in-
habitants of the central authority.153 Finally, Resolution 742
stated that the territory should be free to modify its associated




In 1960, the United Nations General Assembly, through
Resolution 1514,155 created a Decolonization Committee that
provided Members with a forum in which to raise a territory's
"colonial" status.1 56 Within one month of its creation, the Com-
mittee issued Resolution 1541,' 57 which established principles to
determine whether a member country has an obligation to trans-
mit information under Article 73(e) of the Charter.1 51
Principles I, II, and III of Resolution 1541 establish that Ar-
148. G.A. Res. 742, supra note 23, Annex pts. I-I1, at 22.
149. See supra notes 146-47 and accompanying text (discussing G.A. Res 648, which
introduced three alternative forms of self-government).
150. G.A. Res. 742, supra note 23, 6, at 22.




155. G.A. Res. 1514, U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 66, U.N. Doc. A/
4684 (1960).
156. G.A. Res. 742, supra note 23, Annex, pt. III(A)(2), at 22.
157. G.A. Res. 1541, supra note 23, at 29.
158. Id.; U.N. CIARTER art. 73(e).
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ticle 73(e) of the U.N. Charter applies to all territories that have
not yet attained a full measure of self-government. 1 9 These
principles also impose upon the administering country an obli-
gation to transmit certain information to the Secretary-Gen-
eral.1 60 Principle IV of Resolution 1541 states that there is a
prima facie obligation to transmit information regarding a terri-
tory that is geographically separate and ethnically or culturally
distinct from the country administering it.'
Once such a prima facie case of geographical and ethnic or
cultural distinctness of a territory exists, Principle V of Resolu-
tion 1541 provides for consideration of other elements. 62 These
elements include administrative, political, juridical, and eco-
nomic considerations.16s If these elements demonstrate that the
territory is in a position of subordination to the country adminis-
tering it, there is a primafacie presumption that there is an obli-
gation to transmit information.'64
Principle VI of Resolution 1541 provides that free associa-
tion with another state is one method by which a territory may
achieve full self-government. 65 Principle VII sets out the mini-
mum terms and conditions for free association of a territory with
an independent State. 166 These conditions include the free asso-
ciation established as a result of free and voluntary choice. 167
This choice may be expressed through informed and democratic
processes that respect the individuality and cultural characteris-
tics of the territory and its inhabitants. 68 Such a democratic
process enables the people of a territory to retain the freedom to
159. G.A. Res. 1541, supra note 23, Annex, prin. I-III, at 29. "Chapter XI of the
Charter embodies the concept of Non-Self-Governing Territories in a dynamic state of
evolution and progress towards a 'full measure of self-government'. As soon as a terri-
tory and its people attain a full measure of self-government, the obligation ceases." Id.
160. Id. U.N. Charter Article 73(e) requires transmission of information regard-
ing social, economic and educational conditions of territories. U.N. CHARTER art.
73(e).




165. Id. Annex, prin. VI, at 29. Principle VI also sets out independence and inte-
gration with another state as valid methods to satisfy the self-government requirement.
Id.





modify the status of that territory through the expression of
their will. 169 Furthermore, Principle VII provides that the associ-
ated territory should have the right to determine its internal
Constitution without outside interference.1 7 0  Thus, the terri-
tory's population should democratically choose free association
status.1 71 The territory should have the right to determine its
own Constitution without interference by the independent State
with which it is associated.1 72
2. Resolution 748
The United States complied with the above U.N. guidelines
until the General Assembly issued Resolution 748 on November
27, 1953.17' Resolution 748 provided for the cessation of trans-
mission of information on Puerto Rico under Article 73(e). 74
The General Assembly premised this Resolution on two fac-
tors. 1 75 These included the consummation of a free political as-
sociation 176 between Puerto Rico and the United States, as mani-
fested in the establishment of the Commonwealth government,
and the entry into force of the Puerto Rican Constitution. 77
Specifically, Resolution 748 recognized the respect the United
States gave to Puerto Rico's individual cultural characteristics,
the adoption of a new status through free and democratic ex-
pression, and the creation of an autonomous political entity.' 78
II. THE DISCREPANCY IN EVALUATING PUERTO RICO'S
CURRENT POLITICAL STATUS





173. G.A. Res. 748, supra note 20. Resolution 748 states that "as a result of the
entry into force on 25 July 1952 of the Constitution of Puerto Rico... the Government
of the United States of America would cease to transmit information under Article
73(e) of the Charter." Id. pmbl., at 26.
174. Id. The United States started filing reports with respect to Puerto Rico in
June of 1947. TORRUELLA, supra note 35, at 160.
175. G.A. Res. 748, supra note 20, pmbl. at 25-26.
176. See G.A. Res. 742, supra note 23, Annex, pt. III (discussing free association
status).
177. Id.; see supra notes 112-21 and accompanying text (discussing adoption of
Public Laws 600 and 447).
178. G.A. Res. 748, supra note 20, 1 5, at 26.
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lic Laws 600 and 447179 and their effects on Puerto Rico's status.
This Note also examines the requirements of a self-governing
territory under Resolutions 742180 and 1541181 to determine
whether the status of Puerto Rico complies as a self-governing
territory. Some commentators argue that Puerto Rico and the
United States entered into a bilateral compact, thereby comply-
ing with the free associated status as prescribed in Resolution
1541.182 Other commentators, however, feel that Puerto Rico's
current Commonwealth status does not comply with interna-
tional law because no compact was formed during the period
between 1950-52.183 Alternatively, some commentators argue
that if the United States and Puerto Rico formed a compact, it
was not upheld.
84
179. See supra notes 112-21 and accompanying text (discussing adoption of Public
Laws 600 and 447).
180. G.A. Res. 742, supra note 23, at 21.
181. G.A. Res. 1541, supra note 23, at 29. David M. Helfeld, How Much of the
United States Constitution and Statutes are Applicable to the Commonwealth of Puerto
Rico?, Address Before the Judicial Conference of the First Circuit (Sept. 1986), in 110
F.R.D. 452, 463-465 (1985) [hereinafter Helfeld, First Circuit Address]. Several com-
mentators support the validity of the compact. See Proposed Legislation, supra note 16, pt.
II, at 16-19 (statement of Resident Commissioner Jaime Fuster) (discussing validity of
Commonwealth status); Rivera Cruz Letter, supra note 14, at 82-84. Other commenta-
tors do not support the validity of the compact. See TORRUELLA, supra note 35, at 158-
59; Guillermo Moscoso, Puerto Rico still an unincorporated territory, SAN JuAN STAR, Mar. 2,
1993, at 32 [hereinafter Moscoso, PR Still Unincorporated]; Moscoso, Quo vadis, supra
note 21, at 35; Guillermo Moscoso, P.R. 's ambivalent status, SANJuAN STAR, Dec. 5, 1992,
at 34 [hereinafter Moscoso, PR's Ambivalent Status]; U.N. Doc. A/AC.109/PV 1390,
supra note 17, at 46 (statement of Zaida Hernindez Torres) (discussing Puerto Rico's
colonial status and failure of bilateral pact).
182. Helfeld, First Circuit Address, supra note 181, at 463-65; Rivera Cruz Letter,
supra note 14, at 82-84; see Proposed Legislation, supra note 16, pt. II, at 16-19 (statement
of Resident Commissioner Jaime Fuster) (discussing validity of Commonwealth status).
183. TORRUELLA, supra note 35 at 158-59; Moscoso, Puerto Rico still unincorporated,
supra note 181, at 32; Moscoso, Quo vadis, supra note 21, at 35; Moscoso, P.R. 's Ambiva-
lent Status, supra note 181, at 34; U.N. Doc. A/AC.109/PV 1390, supra note 17, at 46
(statement of Zaida Hernindez Torres) (discussing Puerto Rico's colonial status and
failure of bilateral pact).
184. Helfeld, First Circuit Address, supra note 181, at 463-65 (citing Garcia Mufiz,
Puerto Rico and the United States: The United Nations Role - 1953-1975, 53 REV. JUR.
U.P.R. 1 (1984); Rivera Lugo, Puerto Rico Ante La ONU (1976-1983): Autodeterminaci6n y
Transferencia de Poderes, 53 REv. JUR. U.P.R. 267 (1984)); Van Dyke, supra note 15, at
452, 479-80, 513 (discussing unilateral changes to compact).
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A. The Current Status of Puerto Rico Complies With Free Associated
Status As Prescribed by Resolution 1541 and Adheres to theBilateral Compact
Those who view Puerto Rico as a self-governing territory
hold that a bilateral compact culminated from the adoption of
Public Law 447,85 the Puerto Rico Federal Relations Act, 8 ' and
the Constitution 8 7 of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. 188
These commentators argue that the adoption of a new system of
government for Puerto Rico between 1950 and 1952 required
the approval of both the United States and Puerto Rico. 89 Ac-
cordingly, the United States and Puerto Rico mutually con-
sented to adopt the new government. 9
After the U.S. Congress approved Public Law 600,191 which
provided a loose framework for the adoption of the Puerto Rico
Constitution, a referendum in Puerto Rico approved the con-
tents of Public Law 600.192 Thereafter, the elected delegates to
the constitutional convention in Puerto Rico approved the Con-
stitution and submitted it to a referendum of the electorate.1 93
On March 3, 1952, the electorate of Puerto Rico overwhelmingly
approved the Constitution.' 94 On April 22, 1952, U.S. President
Harry S. Truman declared that the Puerto Rico Constitution
185. Public Law 447, 66 Stat. 327; see supra notes 112-21 and accompanying text
(discussing adoption of Public Laws 600 and 447).
186. Public Law 600, 64 Stat. at 319. Section 4 of Public Law 600 provided that the
Puerto Rico Constitution should govern local matters, while the amended part of the
Organic Act (The Foraker Act which later was amended and became the Jones Act)
concerning Puerto Rico-United States relations would continue in force as the "Puerto
Rico Federal Relations Act." BHANA, supra note 17, at 132; TORRUELLA, supra note 35,
at 146; see supra notes 112-21 and accompanying text (discussing adoption of Pub. L.
No. 600); supra note 30 (discussing legislative history of Organic Act of Puerto Rico).
187. See supra note 12 (discussing Puerto Rico Constitution and U.S. legislation
adopting Puerto Rico Constitution).
188. Helfeld, First Circuit Address, supra note 181, at 463-65; Rivera Cruz Letter,
supra note 14, at 82-84; see Leibowitz, supra note 14, at 30-31 (discussing official Com-
monwealth position that scope of compact includes Puerto Rico Constitution and Fed-
eral Relations Act).
189. Helfeld, First Circuit Address, supra note 181, at 463-65; Rivera Cruz Letter,
supra note 14, at 82-84.
190. Helfeld, First Circuit Address, supra note 181, at 463-65.
191. See supra notes 112-21 and accompanying text (discussing adoption of Public
Law 600).
192. ToRRUELLA, supra note 35, at 153.
193. Id.
194. The electorate of Puerto Rico approved the Constitution by 373,544 votes in
favor and 82,877 votes against. ToRRUELLA, supra note 35, at 153.
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complied with both the terms of Public Law 600 and the U.S.
Constitution, and submitted it to the U.S. Congress for final ap-
proval.'95 President Truman hailed the new relationship, based
on the referendum in Puerto Rico that favored Public Law 600,
the drafting of the Puerto Rico Constitution, and its subsequent
approval by the U.S. Congress with minor changes, as a relation-
ship based on mutual consent and esteem.' 96
Shortly after the establishment of the Estado Libre
Asociado, 97 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit'9 8
echoed the importance of this bilateral process in Figueroa v. Pu-
erto Rico. 199 The First Circuit stated that Public Law 600 offered
the people of Puerto Rico a compact that permitted them to or-
ganize a government pursuant to a constitution of their own
adoption.2 0 0 The court noted that the compact stood as an ex-
pression of the will of the people of Puerto Rico. 20 ' According to
the First Circuit, the nature of the compact presumed mutual
consent.
2 02
Commentators who agree that Puerto Rico's status complies
with Resolutions 742 and 1541203 also cite the language of Public
Law 600 as evidence of mutual consent.204 Public Law 600 states
that the Act is adopted "in the nature of a compact" between the
people of Puerto Rico and the U.S. Congress.2 05 Notably, Mr.
Mason Sears, a U.S. delegate to the United Nations, endorsed
the compact theory in his presentation of the U.S. position
before the U.N. General Assembly's Committee on Information
from Non-Self Governing Territories on August 27, 1953.206 Mr.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. See supra notes 112-121 and accompanying text (discussing establishment of
ELA).
198. See The Jones Act, 39 Stat. at 966. The courts of Puerto Rico became subject
to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in 1917. Id.; Jose TRAS MONGE, EL
CHOQUE DE Dos CULTURASJUR1DICAS EN PUERTO RICO 113 (1991).
199. 232 F.2d 615 (1st Cir. 1956).
200. Id. at 617; Proposed Legislation, supra note 16, at 16 (statement of Mr. Jaime
Fuster, former Resident Commissioner) (quoting Figueroa, 232 F.2d at 615).
201. Figueroa, 232 F.2d at 617.
202. Id.; G.A. Res. 1541, supra note 23, Annex, princ. VII, at 29. Principle VII of
G.A. Res. 1541 declares that "free association should be the result of a free and volun-
tary choice by the peoples of the territory .... " Id.
203. G.A. Res. 742, supra note 23; G.A. Res. 1541, supra note 23.
204. Helfeld, First Circuit Address, supra note 181, at 463.
205. Id.
206. Mason Sears, U.S. Delegate to the United Nations, Speech before the General
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Sears maintained that the new constitution was adopted "in the
nature of a compact. "207 As a result, the compact represented a
stronger arrangement between the two parties because the com-
pact could not be denounced by one side alone.20 8 The provi-
sions of the Federal Relations Act 2°9 became provisions of a com-
pact, bilateral in nature, the terms of which could be changed
only by common consent.2 10 Accordingly, Public Law 600 ena-
bled Puerto Rico to govern local affairs and to enact a constitu-
tion that conformed with both the U.S. Constitution and Public
Law 600 so as to form a "compact."211 Thus, commentators
maintain that the compact binds both Puerto Rico and the
United States, and can be modified only through the bilateral
consent of the parties.212
The commentators arguing that Puerto Rico's status com-
plies with U.N. requirements note that the U.N. passed General
Assembly Resolution 748,213 which relieves the United States of
reporting requirements based on Puerto Rico's new self-gov-
erning status.214 Resolution 748 recognizes that the compact in-
vests the people of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico with at-
tributes of sovereignty and identifies the status of self-govern-
ment attained as that of an autonomous political entity.21 5
Assembly's Committee on Information from Non-Self Governing Territories (Aug. 27,
1953), reprinted in TORRUELLA, supra note 35, at 162-163; Leibowitz, supra note 14, at 22.
Mason Sears echoed the compact language by stating:
A most interesting feature of the new constitution is that it was entered into in
the nature of a compact between the American and Puerto Rican people. A
compact, as you know, is far stronger than a treaty. A treaty usually can be
denounced by either side, whereas a compact cannot be denounced by either
party unless it has the permission of the other.
ToRRJUELLA, supra note 35, at 162-63; see Proposed Legislation, supra note 16, pt. II at 18
(statement of Mr. Jaime Fuster) (quoting Frances Bolton's statement as part of U.S.
delegation to United Nations in 1953).
207. ToRRUELLA, supra note 35, at 162-63; Leibowitz, supra note 14, at 22.
208. TORRUELLA, supra note 35, at 162-63.
209. See supra notes 112-21 and accompanying text (discussing establishment of
ELA); supra note 186 (discussing Federal Relations Act).
210. Helfeld, First Circuit Address, supra note 181, at 464.
211. Pub. L. No. 600, 64 Stat. at 319; 98 CONG. REc. 6183, 7924 (1952); Leibowitz,
supra note 14, at 26-27.
212. 98 CONG. REC. 6183, 7924 (1952); Leibowitz, supra note 14, at 26-28.
213. Proposed Legislation, supra note 16, at 32-33 (statement of Mr. Jaime Benitez,
former Resident Commissioner) (quoting G.A. Res. 748, supra note 20, 2-5, at 26);
see supra note 174 and accompanying text (discussing Resolution 748).
214. G.A. Res 748, supra note 20, 5, at 26.
215. Proposed Legislation, supra note 16, at 32-33 (statement of Mr. Jaime Benitez,
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A change in Puerto Rico's status would require both a con-
sensus in Puerto Rico and a consensus in the U.S. Congress.21 6
As a result, supporters of the compact and the validity of the
Commonwealth status attribute the failure of the United States
to modify Puerto Rico's status to a lack of consensus in Puerto
Rico, as well as to the U.S. Congress' failure to agree to a
change.2 1 ' Furthermore, the commentators continue to uphold
the validity of relations between Puerto Rico and the United
States, notwithstanding the fact that all efforts to improve or
change Commonwealth status since 1952 have failed.2 18 These
commentators maintain that in order to send a clear message to
the U.S. Congress that the majority of the people stand behind
one status option, Puerto Rico should vote by a margin greater
than fifty percent to bring about any status change.2 1 9
B. Federal Case Law Supporting the Validity of the Compact Theory
Federal case law provides additional reinforcement for the
validity of Puerto Rico's current status.22 ' Following the adop-
tion of Public Law 600 and the Puerto Rico Constitution,2 sev-
eral cases decided by the U.S. Supreme Court and the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit suggest that Puerto Rico
has autonomy in local matters analogous to that of U.S. states.222
former Resident Commissioner) (quoting GA Resolution 748, supra note 20, 1 2-5, at
26).
216. Helfeld, First Circuit Address, supra note 181, at 473. Dr. David M. Helfeld,
former Dean of the University of Puerto Rico's Law School and constitutional scholar,
noted: "For there to be substantial and meaningful change [in Puerto Rico' status] de-
pends on two conditions: achieving a modicum of consensus in Puerto Rico and con-
verting that consensus into a bilateral agreement with Congress and the President." Id.;
see Leibowitz, supra note 14, at 65; Moscoso, PR Still Unincorporated, supra note 181, at
32.
217. Helfeld, First Circuit Address, supra note 181, at 473; Leibowitz, supra note
14, at 65.
218. Helfeld, First Circuit Address, supra note 181, at 473.
219. Id.; see Carlos Romero Barcel6, Island's 'colonial'status remains a topic of debate,
SAN JUAN STAR, Jan. 9, 1994, at V1 (discussing need to vote for one status option by
margin greater than 50%).
220. Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing, 416 U.S. 663, 672-74 (1974); Examin-
ing Bd. of Eng'rs, Architects and Surveyors v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 572 (1976);
United States v. Quifiones, 758 F.2d 40 (1st Cir. 1985); Helfeld, First Circuit Address,
supra note 181, at 464-65.
221. See supra notes 112-121 and accompanying text (discussing Public Laws 600
and 447).
222. Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 672-74 (discussing Puerto Rico's autonomy in local
matters analogous to that of states); Examining Board, 426 U.S. at 572 (allowing court to
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Thus, commentators cite federal case law acknowledging Puerto
Rico's autonomy in local matters and unique status in validating
Puerto Rico's current status. 2 3
In Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 224 the U.S.
Supreme Court strongly suggested that Puerto Rico has a degree
of autonomy in local matters analogous to that of states.225 The
Court, in reviewing the constitutionality of a statute of the Com-
monwealth of Puerto Rico, recognized Puerto Rico as a state for
the purposes of bringing a direct appeal from the decision of the
three-judge court convened in Puerto Rico pursuant to the
Three-Judge Court Act.226 The Three-Judge Court Act required
three judges to sit in suits to enjoin enforcement of a state stat-
ute on constitutional grounds.227 The Supreme Court held that
Puerto Rico was a state for the purpose of the Three-Judge Court
Act because the Commonwealth achieved a degree of authority
over its internal affairs and acted as a sovereign over matters not
controlled by the U.S. Constitution. 228 The Court also main-
tained that federal due process applied to Puerto Rican legisla-
tion, but did not specify whether such a right existed pursuant to
the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments. 229
The commentators who support the validity of the compact
hear challenge to Puerto Rico statute pursuant to Act addressing deprivation under
color of state law); Quiiiones, 758 F.2d at 42 (maintaining that Puerto Rico was no
longer territory subject to plenary power of U.S. Congress).
223. See, e.g., Leibowitz, supra note 14, at 1, 30-34; Rivera Cruz Letter, supra note
14, at 82-85;
224. Calero, 416 U.S. at 672-74.
225. Id. at 672. The Court stated:
Puerto Rico has thus not become a State in the federal union like the 48
States, but it would seem to have become a State within a common and ac-
cepted meaning of the word.... It is a political entity created by the act and
with the consent of the people of Puerto Rico and joined in union with the
United States of America under the terms of the compact.
Id.
226. 28 U.S.C. § 2281 (repealed 1976). In Calero, the issue was whether appellate
jurisdiction existed to hear a direct appeal from a decision of the three judge court
convened in the District of Puerto Rico to determine the constitutionality of a statute of
the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. 416 U.S. 663; TORRUELLA, supra note 35, at 178.
Section 2281 provided "that an interlocutory or permanent injunction restraining the
enforcement, operation or execution of a State statute on grounds of unconstitutional-
ity should not be granted unless the application has been heard and determined by a
three-judge district court." 28 U.S.C. § 2281 (repealed 1976).
227. 28 U.S.C. § 2281 (repealed 1976).
228. Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 672-74.
229. Id. at 668-69.
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also cite the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Examining Board of
Engineers, Architects and Surveyors v. Flores de Otero.3 In Examining
Board, two alien civil engineers challenged a Puerto Rican stat-
ute, which required one to attain U.S. citizenship before ob-
taining a license to practice engineering in Puerto Rico,23 ' pur-
suant to the Civil Rights Act.232 The Court determined that the
U.S. District Court for the District of Puerto Rico 233 possessed
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3).234 Section 1343(3)
permitted the district court to entertain a suit that addressed
deprivation under color of state law.235 The Examining Board
Court concluded that the U.S. District Court for the District of
Puerto Rico had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) to hear
the suit.23 6 The Court maintained that Puerto Rico was neither a
state nor a territory, but instead, a commonwealth.2 3 ' The Court
thus acknowledged both the existence of the compact and the
validity of the commonwealth status.238
230. 426 U.S. 572 (1976).
231. Id. at 577.
232. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988).
233. Act ofJune 26, 1946, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 889 (1946); Act of Sept. 12, 1966, Pub.
L. No. 89-571, 80 Stat. 764 (1966) and Act of June 2, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-272, 84 Stat.
294 (1970). At the time of this action the current U.S. District Court for the District of
Puerto Rico was a territorial court; later legislation changed this status and granted life
tenure to the judges, which made their tenure identical to other U.S. district judges.
Act ofJune 26, 1946, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 889 (1946); Act of Sept. 12, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-
571, 80 Stat. 764 (1966). In 1970, the U.S. Congress provided additional U.S. district
judges throughout the United States, including Puerto Rico. Act of June 2, 1970, Pub.
L. No. 91-272, 84 Stat. 298 (1970).
234. Examining Board, 426 U.S. at 575. The Supreme Court stated the issue as
.whether Puerto Rico is a 'State,' for purposes of § 1343(3), insofar as that statute
speaks of deprivation 'under color of any State law.'" Id. Title 28 U.S.C. § 1343 pro-
vides:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action authorized
by law to be commenced by a person: ... (3) To redress the deprivation,
under color of any State law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage,
of any right, privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution of the United
States or by any Act of Congress providing for equal rights of citizens of all
persons within the jurisdiction of the United States.
28 U.S.C. § 1343 (1988).
235. 426 U.S. at 597; see Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 317 (1981). The
U.S. Supreme Court held that "a person acts under color of state law only when exercis-
ing power 'possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrong-
doer is clothed with the authority of state law.' " Polk, 454 U.S. at 317.
236. Examining Board, 426 U.S. at 597.
237. Id. at 593-94.
238. Id.; see Proposed Legislation, supra, note 16, pt. II, at 16-19 (statement of Resi-
dent CommisionerJaime Fuster) (maintaining that in 1952 compact became effective,
1036 FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL [Vol. 17:1006
In United States v. Quifiones,239 the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the First Circuit discussed Puerto Rico's status in terms favorable
to Commonwealth supporters.2 40 The First Circuit maintained
that in 1952, Puerto Rico ceased to be a territory, subject to U.S.
Congress' plenary authority, through the territorial clause of the
U.S. Constitution.241 Furthermore, the First Circuit stated that
the authority exercised by the U.S. government came from the
compact itself, and that this compact could not be amended uni-
laterally.242 Consequently, commentators reason that Puerto
Rico's status is not that of a local autonomy subject to the Terri-
torial Clause of the U.S. Constitution, but that of a self-gov-
erning entity that has delegated powers to the federal govern-
ment as specified in the compact.
243
C. Puerto Rico's Current Status Does Not Uphold International Law
and Fails to Adhere to the "Bilateral Compact"
A growing number of commentators who view Puerto Rico
as a colonial territory argue that the establishment of the Com-
monwealth government and the adoption of the Puerto Rico
Constitution 24 4 failed to alter the model for the U.S.-Puerto Rico
relationship created in the Insular Cases.245 Arguments that as-
and Puerto Rico assumed Commonwealth status); see also U.S. GAO REPORT, supra note
15, at 83.
239. 758 F.2d 40 (1st Cir. 1985).
240. Id.
241. Id. at 42. See supra note 9 and accompanying text (discussing Territorial
Clause).
242. Quifiones, 758 F.2d at 42. The court stated:
In 1952, Puerto Rico ceased being a territory of the United States subject to
the plenary powers of Congress as provided in the Federal Constitution. The
authority exercised by the federal government emanated thereafter from the
compact itself. Under the compact between the people of Puerto Rico and the
United States, Congress cannot amend the Puerto Rico Constitution unilater-
ally, and the government of Puerto Rico is no longer a federal government
agency exercising delegated power.
Id.
243. Id.; see Proposed Legislation, supra, note 16, pt. II, at 16-19 (statement of Resi-
dent CommisionerJaime Fuster) (discussing validity of Commonwealth status and com-
pact).
1 244. PUERTO Rico CONST. The U.S. Congress approved the Puerto Rico Constitu-
tion on July 25, 1952. Public Law 447, 66 Stat. at 327.
245. Cabranes, First Circuit Address, supra note 13, at 481. "The key point about
Puerto Rico's place in the American Constitutional System is that no word other than
'colonialism' adequately describes the relationship between a powerful metropolitan
state and an impoverished overseas dependency disenfranchised from the formal law-
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sail the validity of Puerto Rico's current status fall into two cate-
gories. First, some legal scholars assert that Puerto Rico and the
United States have not formed a compact.246 Second, others be-
lieve that even if a compact was formed, it has not been up-
held.
247
1. Some Commentators Do Not Believe That a Compact Was
Formed in the Years 1950-52
a. Legislative History of Public Law 600
Commentators note that the legislative history accompany-
ing the adoption of Public Law 600 demonstrates that the U.S.
Congress did not intend to abdicate its authority under the Ter-
ritorial Clause or to alter significantly Puerto Rico's status. 248
House Report 2275, which accompanied Public Law 600, ex-
plains that the effect of Public Law 600 was to alter matters of
purely local concern. 249 House Report 2275 emphasized that
Puerto Rico's fundamental political, social, and economic rela-
tionship to the United States would not change. 250
making processes that shape its people's daily lives." Id. at 480; see TORRUELLA, supra
note 35, at 267-68 (discussing continuing validity of Insular Cases); Insular Cases, supra
note 8 (discussing U.S. Supreme Court cases that determined status of U.S. territories).
246. See TORRUELLA supra note 35, at 146-53, 193 (doubting existence of compact);
U.N. Doc. A/AC.109/PV 1390, supra note 17, at 46-52 (statement of Zaida Herndndez
Torres) (discussing P.R's colonial status and attacking bilateral pact); Moscoso, PR still
unincorporated, supra note 181, at 32 (arguing Puerto Rico is still unincorporated terri-
tory); Moscoso, Quo vadis, supra note 21, at 35 (questioning validity of compact); Guil-
lermo Moscoso, PR in the United Nations, SAN JUAN STAR, Aug. 14, 1991, at 12 [hereinaf-
ter Moscoso, PR in U.N.] (discussing Puerto Rico's continuing colonial status).
247. United States v. Valentine, 288 F. Supp. 957, 981, n.24 (P.R. Dec. 1968) (limit-
ing scope of compact to certain essential provisions); Helfeld, First Circuit Address,
supra note 181, at 465 n.65; Van Dyke, supra note 15, at 452, 470-80 (discussing unilat-
eral changes to compact).
248. H.R. Rt. No. 2275, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., (1950), reprinted in 1950 U.S.C.C.S.
2681 [hereinafter H.R. REP,. No. 2275]; Leibowitz, supra note 14, at 23-31; Stein, Notes
on the History of Puerto Rico's Commonwealth Status, 30 REv. JUR. U.P.R. 33 (1961);
Helfeld, Congressional Intent and Attitude Toward Public Law 600 and the Constitution of the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, 21 REv. JUR. U.P.R. 255 (1952) [hereinafter Helfeld, Con-
gressional Intent] (discussing unchanged U.S. Congressional power after adopting Public
Law 600).
249. H.R. REP. No. 2275, supra note 248, at 2681-84.
250. Id. at 2682-83.
It is important that the nature and' general scope of S. 3336 be made abso-
lutely clear. The bill under consideration would not change Puerto Rico's funda-
mental political, social, and economic relationship to the United States. Those sec-
tions of the Organic Act of Puerto Rico pertaining to the political, social, and
economic relationship of the United States and Puerto Rico concerning such
1994] 1037
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These authors maintain that the U.S. Congress did not be-
lieve that the bill accompanying Public Law 600 changed the es-
sential nature of Puerto Rico's subordinate status.2 51 For exam-
ple, Delegate Bartlett of Alaska, in supporting the bill, stated that
there was no need to fear passage of the bill because the U.S.
Congress retained all of its powers under the U.S. Constitution
and the Territorial Clause.252 Therefore, Delegate Bartlett be-
lieved that only Congress would ultimately determine the
changes, if any at all, to the status of the island.2 53 Although
authors refer to the ambiguity of the language of Public Law
600, "in the nature of a compact,"254 commentators also main-
tain that a review of the legislative history leading up to the
adoption of Public Law 600 clarifies any ambiguity in the lan-
guage of Public Law 600.255
matters as the applicability of United States laws, customs, internal revenue,
Federal judicial jurisdiction in Puerto Rico, Puerto Rican representation by a
Resident Commissioner, etc. would remain in force and effect, and upon en-
actment of S. 3336 would be referred to as the Puerto Rican Federal Relations
Act.
Id. at 2682-83 (emphasis added); see TORRUELLA, supra note 35, at 150-153; B-ANA,
supra note 17, at 126.
251. TORRUELLA, supra note 35, at 147; BHANA, supra note 15, at 126; Guillermo
Moscoso, The time has come, SAN JuAN STAR, May 9, 1990, at 24 [hereinafter Moscoso,
Time has Come].
252. 96 CONG. REc. 9594, 9595 (1950). Delegate Bartlett specifically stated that:
[n]o one need have any apprehension about a grant of undue powers under
this Act to the people of Puerto Rico. Congress retains all essential powers set
forth under our constitutional system, and it will be Congress and Congress
alone which ultimately will determine the changes, if any, in the political sta-
tus of the island.
Id.
253. Id.
254. See supra notes 112-21 and accompanying text (discussing adoption of Public
Law 600).
255. TORRUELLA, supra note 35, at 147-48. The ambiguity regarding the type of
relationship created by Public Law 600 stems from the vague language of the Act: "this
Act is now adopted in the nature of a compact so that the people of Puerto Rico may
organize a government pursuant to a system of their own adoption .... " Public Law
600, 64 Stat. at 319. The language proposed by Muiloz-Marfn's legal advisors was "to
organize their democratic government in accordance with a Constitution of their own
adoption which will recognize and incorporate the principles of local self government
within the Federal Union and will be in the nature of a compact between themselves and
the Government of the United States." TORRUELLA, supra note 35, at 147; CAut, supra
note 11, at 77-78; see supra notes 112-21 and accompanying text (discussing Public Law
600).
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b. Public Law 600 Satisfied Demands For Democracy and Self-
Determination
In order to support the view that Public Law 600 effected
only cosmetic change, commentators argue that the changes
were merely a symbol of democracy to pacify the demands for
self-determination in the early 1950'S. 256 The language of House
Report 2275 regarding Senate Bill 3336 supports this theory.2 57
House Report 2275 explicitly states that the bill would have great
value as a symbol of freedom at a time when anti-American prop-
aganda accused the United States of engaging in colonialism
and imperialism.2 5 The U.S. Congress benefitted by permitting
a Constitution that did not significantly alter the relationship, yet
represented a step toward "decolonization" to the international
community.2 59
c. The Manner in Which the Puerto Rico Constitution Was
Adopted Asserts Congress' Continuing Control
Through the Territorial Clause
Commentators add that the manner in which the U.S. Con-
gress and Puerto Rico adopted the Puerto Rico Constitution also
reaffirms Congress' continuing control over Puerto Rico
through the Territorial Clause.2 60 The current Governor of Pu-
erto Rico, Mr. Pedro Rossell6, argues that the failure to allow
Puerto Rico to adopt a Constitution free from outside control
256. CARR, supra note 11, at 72-73. Puerto Rico could capitalize on the then cur-
rent political climate to demand democracy. Id. First, World War II, fought in the
name of democracy, had just ended; second, Puerto Rico was gaining in strategic im-
portance to the United States and President Truman was acting in the spirit of the
United Nations Charter. Id.
257. H.R. REP. No. 2275, supra note 248, at 2689; Leibowitz, supra note 14, at 23-
31; Helfeld, Congressional Intent, supra note 248, at 307, 314.
258. H.R. REP. No. 2275, supra note 248, at 2689. "In view of the importance of
'colonialism' and 'imperialism' in anti-American propaganda, the Department of State
feels that S. 3336 would have a great value as a symbol of the basic freedom enjoyed by
Puerto Rico, within the larger framework of the United States of America." Id. at 2689
(emphasis added).
259. CARR, supra note 11, at 75. "There is no question that the Executive branch's
concern with the status of Puerto Rico was exacerbated by commitments before the
United Nations and the Atlantic Charter." TORRUELLA, supra note 35, at 141.
260. Moscoso, PR still unincorporated, supra note 181, at 32; Moscoso, Quo vadis,
supra note 21, at 35; Moscoso, PR in U.N., supra note 246, at 12 (discussing Puerto
Rico's continuing colonial status).
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does not accord with Resolution 1541.261 According to Mr. Ros-
sell6, the U.S. Congress' continuing control is apparent from the
inception of the Commonwealth government. 262 The electorate
of Puerto Rico approved the Puerto Rico Constitution on March
3, 1952.263 After approval in Puerto Rico,264 however, the U.S.
Congress unilaterally deleted Sections 5 and 20 of the Bill of
Rights of the Puerto Rico Constitution. 65 Neither the people
nor the Congress of Puerto Rico approved these subsequent
changes.266  Governor Rossell6 maintains that this unilateral as-
sertion of the U.S. Congress' authority affecting the content of
the Puerto Rico Constitution violates Principle VII(b) of Resolu-
tion 1541.267 Despite the provisions of Resolution 1541 that ex-
pressly provide that a territory has a right to determine its consti-
tution free of outside interference, Puerto Rico did not have the
opportunity to determine its internal constitution without
outside interference. 68
Commentators who maintain that the Puerto Rico Constitu-
tion was not adopted free from outside interference refer to a
proposed amendment to the Puerto Rico Constitution initiated
by Senator J. Bennett Johnston 269 that provided for future
261. See G.A. Res. 1541, supra note 23, princ. VII(b), at 29-30 (stating that associ-
ated territory should be free to adopt constitution without outside control).
262. Id.; U.N. Doc. A/AC.109/PV 1390, supra note 17, at 6. (statement of Pedro
Rossell6, Chairman of the Partido Nuevo Progressista).
263. TORRUELLA, supra note 35, at 153.
264. See supra notes 112-21 and accompanying text (discussing approval of Puerto
Rico Constitution).
265. TORRUELLA, supra note 35, at 154 n.573. Section 5 of the proposed constitu-
tion of Puerto Rico provided for free public education, while Section 20 provided for
certain human rights, including public elementary and secondary education and disa-
bility protection. Id.
266. U.N. Doc. A/AC.109/PV 1390, supra note 17, at 6 (statement of Pedro Ros-
sell6, current Governor of Puerto Rico).
267. Id. at 8.
268. G.A. Res. 1541, supra note 23, princ. VII., at 29-30. Principle VII(b) of Resolu-
tion 1541 provides: "The associated territory should have the right to determine its
internal constitution without outside interference, in accordance with due constitu-
tional processes and the freely expressed wishes of the people." Id.
269. Kitty Dumas, Practice Makes Puerto Rico A Force Heard in Congress, 48 CONG. Q.
WKLu. REP. 4074 (1990) [hereinafter Dumas, Practice Makes PR a Force]. Sen.J. Bennett
Johnston [D-LA] is the chairman of the Energy and Natural Resources Committee and
has been described as "the Senate's standard-bearer on the Puerto Rican status issue"
for his long-term involvement in this issue. Id. at 4076.
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amendments to the Puerto Rico Constitution.270 The Johnston
amendment proposed that the Puerto Rico Constitution could
not be amended without the consent of the U.S. Congress.2 7
Former Governor Luis Mufioz-Marin 272 expressed discontent
with Senator Johnston's proposal.2 7' Thereafter, Mr. Mufioz-Ma-
rin agreed to a compromise whereby the Puerto Rico Constitu-
tion could not be changed in a manner incompatible with Public
Law 600, the Federal Relations Act, dispositions of the U.S. Con-
stitution applicable to Puerto Rico, or Public Law 447.27 Thus,
despite the compromise, the U.S. Congress maintained its au-
thority by providing that any future changes conform with the
Territorial Clause authority.2 75 As the Insular Cases established,
the U.S. Congress' authority pursuant to the Territorial Clause is
plenary. 76
d. "In the Nature of a Compact": Ambiguous Language in
Public Law 600 that Accomodated Irreconcilable
Differences
Those who believe that a compact was not formed maintain
that the ambiguous phrase "in the nature of a compact"2 77 at
best accommodated irreconcilable interests.278 As former Gover-
nor Mufioz-Marin could not use the term "contract," he resorted
to the less defined "compact."2 79 The U.S. Congress sought to
pacify Mr. Mufioz-Marln's demands without giving up its author-
270. CARR, supra note 11, at 79; Helfeld, Congressional Intent, supra note 248, at 304-
06.
271. CARR, supra note 11, at 79; Helfeld, Congressional Intent, supra note 248, at 304-
06.
272. BHANA, supra note 17, at 93-108. Luis Mufioz-Marin was the proponent of the
Commonwealth and the first locally elected Governor of Puerto Rico. Mr. Mufioz-Ma-
r~n remained in office from 1948-1964. Id.
273. 98 CONG. REc. 6183, 7924 (1952); CAR, supra note 11, at 79-80; Leibowitz,
supra, note 14, at 26-28.
274. 98 CONG. REC. 6183, 7924 (1952); CAR, supra note 11, at 79-80; Helfeld,
Congressional Intent, supra note 248, at 304-06; Leibowitz, supra note 14, at 26-28.
275. Pfrez-Bachs, supra note 24, at 485-87 (discussing lack of limitation on U.S.
Congress' power through Territorial Clause).
276. CA Ru, supra note 11, at 79-80; Moscoso, PR still unincorporated, supra note 181,
at 32; Pfrez-Bachs, supra note 24, at 486; see supra note 63 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing U.S. Congress' plenary authority over territories).
277. See supra notes 112-21 and accompanying text (discussing the adoption of
Public Law 600).
278. 6,gt, supra note 11, at 81-82.
279. Id.
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ity over Puerto Rico, which resulted in the ambiguous term "in
the nature of the compact. "280 Consequently, commentators
maintain that the phrase "in the nature of a compact" is not
clear, as it provides an ill-defined and questionable status.281
These commentators hold that the legal ambiguities surround-
ing the nature of the Puerto Rico-United States relationship con-
tinue to affect and impede progress toward an ultimate solution
to Puerto Rico's status. 2
2. Some Authors Believe That Even if a Compact Was Formed,
It Is Not Upheld
a. Judicial Decisions Refute the Current Validity of the
Compact and Affirm Congressional Dominance
Through the Territorial Clause
Commentators who do not view Puerto Rico as a self-gov-
erning territory find support in federal judicial decisions..2 3 De-
spite the decision in United States v. Valentine,28 4 which stated that
a compact governed the U.S.-Puerto Rico relationship, some
scholars note that no federal judge has held the bilateral com-
pact theory to be absolute.285 For example, the District Court of
Puerto Rico qualified the compact 286 as unilaterally irrevocable
280. TORRUELLA, supra note 35, at 155-56 (citing Hearings before the Senate Committee
on Interior and Insular Affairs on SJ Res. 151, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. (1952)).
281. 109 CONG. REc. 20124, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., (1963) (statement of Represen-
tative Leo. W. O'Brien).
No one, in or out of Congress, or in or out of Puerto Rico, knows exactly what
the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico is. I have been Chairman of the Subcom-
mittee on Territorial and Insular Affairs for 9 years and I have spent many
hours, here and in Puerto Rico, seeking an answer to these questions ....
Some . . . insist that Puerto Rico is still, in fact, a colony, a possession ....
Others argue that when we created the first and only commonwealth under
the American flag we entered into an irrevocable compact from which there
could be no withdrawal ....
Id.; TORRUELLA, supra note 35, at 56 (quoting statement of Senator Long).
282. TORRUELLA, supra note 35, at 263-65; Van Dyke, supra note 15, at 515-16.
283. Harris v. Rosario, 446 U.S. 651 (1980); Califano v. Torres, 435 U.S. 1 (1978);
Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v. Mun. of San Juan, 505 F. Supp. 533 (P.R. Dec. 1980); United
States v. Valentine, 288 F. Supp. 957, 981, n.24 (P.R. Dec. 1968); TORRUELLA, supra note
35, at 193; Helfeld, supra note 181, at 463-67 n.63-65.
284. 288 F. Supp. 957 (P.R. Dec. 1968).
285. Helfeld, First Circuit Address, supra note 181, at 464 n.57.
286. See supra notes 112-21 and accompanying text (discussing adoption of Public
Laws 600 and 447 to form compact).
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only with respect to certain essential provisions,287 such as Pu-
erto Rico's association with the United States and U.S. citizen-
ship of its people.288 Under Valentine, the lack of national polit-
ical participation 289 is not a violation of the compact because
such participation was voluntarily waived by the Puerto Rican
people.29 ° Commentators maintain that the compact theory,
which according to the U.S. Congress and the Puerto Rico Com-
monwealth government consists of Public Law 600, Public Law
447, the Federal Relations Act, and the Puerto Rico Constitu-
tion, is kept intact only by limiting the scope of the compact.291
Thus, all four of the components of the compact are not im-
mune to unilateral change as originally contemplated. 9 2 In-
stead, to maintain the validity of the compact, the Federal Rela-
tions Act must be excluded from the components of the com-
pact as originally contemplated.293
Although in some instances Puerto Rico is treated as an
equal among U.S. states,294 commentators assert that this treat-
ment is inconsistent. 95 Commentators who question Puerto
287. United States v. Valentine, 288 F. Supp. 957, 981 n.24 (P.R. Dec. 1968) (hold-
ing that exclusion from jury service in U.S. District Court for Puerto Rico of non-Eng-
lish speakers did not deprive Puerto Rican defendants of due process of law).
288. Id.
To say that the compact is irrevocable unilaterally is not to say that all of its
detailed provisions are. It is only the essential provisions which cannot be re-
voked by one party acting alone: i.e., the provisions which establish Puerto
Rico's status as a Commonwealth with plenary domestic authority, its associa-
tion with the United States, the United States citizenship of its people, and
such favorable concessions as its fiscal autonomy.
Id.
289. U.S. GAO REPORT, supra note 15, at 5, 7; Van Dyke, supra note 15, at 469-71
(discussing Puerto Rico's non-voting representative in U.S. Congress); see Proposed Legis-
lation, supra note 16, pt. I, at 33 (statement of Luis A. Ferr6) (discussing disparate vot-
ing fights).
290. Valentine, 288 F. Supp. at 981.
291. TORRUELLA, supra note 35, at 176 n.678; Helfeld, First Circuit Address, supra
note 181, at 464-66; see supra note 188 and accompanying text (discussing official Com-
monwealth position regarding scope of compact).
292. TORRUELiA, supra note 35, at 176 n.678; Helfeld, First Circuit Address, supra
note 181, at 464-66; see supra note 188 and accompanying text (discussing official Com-
monwealth position regarding scope of compact).
293. TORRUELLA, supra note 35, at 176 n.678; Helfeld, First Circuit Address, supra
note 181, at 464-66; see supra note 188 and accompanying text (discussing official Com-
monwealth position regarding scope of compact).
294. See Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 672-74 (1974).
295. See id. (treating Puerto Rico as equal among U.S. states). But see Harris v.
Rosario, 446 U.S. 651 (1980) (reaffirming U.S. Congress power to treat Puerto Rican
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Rico's self-governing status cite recent judicial decisions that re-
affirm U.S. Congressional dominance over Puerto Rico through
application of the Territorial Clause and do not rely on the com-
pact theory. In Califano v. Torres,29 6 for example, the U.S.
Supreme Court held that the U.S. Congress may not constitu-
tionally discriminate against the elderly, the blind, and the hand-
icapped, who are entitled to receive benefits under the Supple-
mentary Security Income program. 97 This protection from dis-
crimination only applies, however, if a recipient lives in the fifty
states or the District of Columbia.2 98  The U.S. Congress may
therefore discriminate if the recipient lives in Puerto Rico.299
Following the Insular Cases,3°0 the Califano Court maintained
that the U.S. Congress continued to have authority under the
Territorial Clause of the Constitution, and pursuant to this
power, could treat Puerto Rico differently than the states.3 0'
Similarly, in Harris v. Rosario, °2 the U.S. Supreme Court re-
inforced the U.S. Congressional power to treat residents of Pu-
erto Rico differently than residents of U.S. states by virtue of the
Territorial Clause of the U.S. Constitution.0 3 The program of
residents differently than residents of U.S. states through Territorial Clause). See gener-
ally TORRUELLA, supra note 35, at 109 (quoting Examining Bd. of Eng'rs, Architects and
Surveyors v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 572, 599 (1976)); Moscoso, PR's Ambivalent Status,
supra note 181, at 34 (discussing inconsistent treatment of Puerto Rico's status).
296. 435 U.S. 1 (1978).
297. Id. at 2.
298. Id. The Court stated:
"The exclusion of Puerto Rico in the amended program is apparent in the
definitional section. Section 1611(0 of the Act, as set forth in 42 U.S.C.
§ 1382c(f) (1970 ed., Supp. V), states that no individual is eligible for benefits
during any month in which he or she is outside the United States. The Act
defines "the United States" as "the 50 States and the District of Columbia."
§ 1614(e), as set forth in 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(e) (1970 ed., Supp. V).
Id.
299. 435 U.S. at 5.
300. See supra notes 42-78 and accompanying text (discussing Insular Cases).
301. See Califano, 435 U.S. at 3 n.4. The Court stated that: "the District Court ap-
parently acknowledged that Congress has the power to treat Puerto Rico differently,
and that every federal program does not have to be extended to it. Puerto Rico has a
relationship to the United States 'that has no parallel in our history.' " Id. (citing Exam-
ining Board, 426 U:S. at 596). To justify this discriminatory treatment the Court ex-
plained: "First, because of the unique tax status of Puerto Rico, its residents do not
contribute to the public treasury. Second, the cost of including Puerto Rico would be
extremely great - an estimated $300 million per year. Third, inclusion in the SSI
program might seriously disrupt the Puerto Rican economy." Califano, 435 U.S. at 5 n.7.
302. 446 U.S. 651 (1980).
303. Id.
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Aid to Families with Dependent Children 04 discriminated
against residents of Puerto Rico by providing them with less aid
than that given to other U.S. citizens.30 5 The Court stated that
the U.S. Congress, in acting under the Territorial Clause of the
U.S. Constitution, may make all needful rules and regulations
respecting the territory, and may treat residents of Puerto Rico
differently than residents of the fifty states so long as there is a
rational basis for its actions.30 6
In Sea-Land Services, Inc. v. Municipality of San Juan,"°7 the
District Court for the District of Puerto Rico acknowledged that
the U.S. Supreme Court had recently clarified the scope of the
U.S. Congress' authority in Puerto Rico. 0 ' Sea-Land Services
dealt with a challenge to the constitutionality of taxes imposed
by coastal municipal authorities on an ocean transport com-
pany.30 9 The court stated that regardless of the particular consti-
tutional relationship between Puerto Rico and the United States,
the Territorial Clause is still a source of congressional power
over the island. 310 Accordingly, Puerto Rico was constrained by
the prohibitory implications of the Commerce Clause.3 1 1 The
court noted that this was not because the Commerce Clause ap-
plies to Puerto Rico ex proprio vigore, but instead, because it is
binding on the Commonwealth through the Territorial
Clause.1' Commentators maintain that these judicial decisions
304. 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-19 (1988 and Supp. III 1991 and West Supp. 1993).
305. Haris, 446 U.S. at 651.
306. Id. The United States General Accounting Office also confirmed the applica-
bility of the Territorial Clause. U.S. GAO REPORT, supra note 15, at 29.
307. 505 F. Supp. 533 (P.R. Dec. 1980).
308. Id. at 544. "The source of such congressional authority has been recently
clarified by the Supreme Court of the United States in Harris v. Santiago Rosario, 446
U.S. 651 (1980) ... ." Id.
309. 505 F. Supp. at 533.
310. 505 F. Supp. at 544. "It is thus settled that, regardless of the nature of the
particular relationship between Puerto Rico and the United States, the Territorial
Clause is a source of congressional power over the island." Id.
311. Id. at 545. The Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution states that Con-
gress shall have the power "[to regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among
the several States, and with the Indian Tribes." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
312. 505 F. Supp. at 545. The court held that
in the absence of clear congressional acquiescence to the contrary, Puerto
Rico is constrained by the prohibitory implications of the Commerce Clause as
construed by the Supreme Court of the United States. This, however, does
not mean that the Commerce Clause applies to Puerto Rico ex proprio vigore,
but that its prohibitive effect is binding on the Commonwealth through the
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highlight the general disparity prevalent in treatment between
United States stateside citizens and United States citizens resid-
ing in Puerto Rico. 13
Recently, in United States v. Sdnchez, 14 the U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed that Puerto Rico was sub-
ject to the Territorial Clause.s1 ' As a result, Puerto Rico was still
constitutionally a territory, and not a separate sovereign for pur-
poses of the Double Jeopardy clause. s16 In Sdnchez, the defend-
ants were indicted in the Southern District of Florida following
their acquittal in the Superior Court of Puerto Rico.3 17 The
defendents had been charged with attempted murder in Puerto
Rico and contended that to charge them with the transport of
explosives with intent to injure or kill in Florida violated the
Double Jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment.3 18 In deter-
mining whether these successive prosecutions violated the Fifth
Amendment, the court reasoned that prosecutions for the same
unlawful act would not violate the Fifth Amendment when the
prosecutions were brought under the laws of separate sover-
eigns.3 19 States are separate sovereigns with respect to the fed-
Territorial Clause, Art. W, s 3, cl. 2 as an implied corollary of congressional
commerce powers thereunder.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
313. See e.g., ToRRUELLA, supra note 35, at 268 (discussing disparate treatment of
Puerto Rico); Helfeld, First Circuit Address supra note 181, at 454-56 (discussing dichot-
omy of fundamental versus non-fundamental rights, lack of uniformity in taxation and
denial of right to trial byjury); U.N. Doc. A/AC.109/PV 1390, supra note 17, at 26-28
(statement of Kenneth McClintok Hernhndez) (discussing disparate voting rights of
Puerto Ricans and Puerto Rico's colonial status); see also G.A. Res. 742, supra note 23,
Annex, pt. 3, § (B)(3), at 22.
314. 992 F.2d 1143 (11th Cir. 1993).
315. Id. at 1151-52. The court stated that:
[w] ith each new organic act, first the Foraker Act in 1900, then the Jones Act in
1917, and then the Federal Relations Act in 1950 and later amendments, Con-
gress has simply delegated more authority to Puerto Rico over local matters.
But this has not changed in any way Puerto Rico's constitutional status as a
territory, or the source of power over Puerto Rico. Congress continues to be
the ultimate source of power pursuant to the Territory Clause of the Constitu-
tion.
Id. at 1152.
316. Id. at 1151-52. The court stated that "Puerto Rico is still constitutionally a
territory, and not a separate sovereign." Id. The Double Jeopardy Clause of the 5th
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides: "[N]or shall any person be subject for
the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb." U.S. CoNST. amend. V.
317. Sanchez, 992 F.2d at 1145.
318. Id. at 1148; see supra note 316 (discussing Double Jeopardy Clause).
319. Id. at 1148. The court stated that "[w]hile the exact scope of this clause has
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eral government because each state derives its power to prose-
cute from its own inherent sovereignty.320 By contrast, prosecu-
tions in territorial courts are not protected by the dual
sovereignty doctrine.321 The court concluded that the develop-
ment of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico did not give its judi-
cial tribunals a source of punitive authority which is independ-
ent of the U.S. Congress.322 The court further stressed that the
tribunals' power does not derive from an inherent sovereign. 23
Accordingly, the court maintained that Puerto Rico was still a
constitutional territory subject to the U.S. Congress' ultimate
control, pursuant to the Territorial Clause.3 24 The court also
stated that, pursuant to its Territorial Clause authority, the U.S.
Congress may unilaterally repeal the Puerto Rican Constitution
resisted repeated efforts at definition, it is at least well established that successive prose-
cutions for the same unlawful act will not offend the Constitution when they are
brought under the laws of separate sovereigns." Id.
320. Id. at 1149. The court stated that "states are separate sovereigns with respect
to the federal government because each state's power to prosecute is derived from its
own 'inherent sovereignty,' not from the federal government." Id.
321. Id. at 1150. The court held that:
The Shell Court clearly found the dual sovereignty doctrine inapplicable to
prosecutions in the courts of United States territories. This view is supported
by Article IV of the Constitution which mandates that "[t]he Congress shall
have [P]ower to dispose of and make all needful [R]ules and Regulations re-
specting the [T]erritory or other [P]roperty belonging to the United States."
U.S. CONsT. art. IV, [§ 3 1 2]. Punitive authority in a territory of the United
States flows directly from this plenary power. Every excercise of authority in a
territory which does not proceed under a direct Congressional enactment pro-
ceeds, at least, at the sufferance of the Congress, which may override disfa-
vored rules or institutions at will. The United States Congress is the source of
prosecutorial authority for both the courts of United States territories and the
federal district courts. Therefore... prosecutions in territorial courts are not
protected by the dual sovereignty doctrine from application of the Double
Jeopardy Clause.
Id. (footnote omitted).
322. Id. at 1152-53. The court stated that "[t]he development of the Common-
wealth of Puerto Rico has not given its judicial tribunals a source of punitive authority
which is independent of the United States Congress and derived from an 'inherent
sovereignty.'" Id. at 1152.
323. Id.
324. Id. at 1152-53; see supra note 9 and accompanying text (discussing Territorial
Clause). The Sdnchez court found, however, that the conduct for which the defendant
was prosecuted in Puerto Rico differed from the conduct prosecuted in Florida. 992
F.2d. at 1158. Thus, the prosecution of two different unlawful acts did not violate the
Double Jeopardy Clause and the appellant's conviction was affirmed. Id.
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or the Puerto Rican Federal Relations Act3 25 and replace them
with any rules or regulations of its choice.326
b. Unilateral Congressional Changes to the Federal Relations
Act Demonstrate That the Compact is Not Bilateral
Some authors maintain that unilateral congressional
changes in the Federal Relations Act12 7 also evidence the lack of
a bilateral pact.128 In 1966 and 1970, the U.S. Congress unilater-
ally changed the scope of the jurisdiction of the Federal District
Court of Puerto Rico and the tenure of its judges.129 In 1984,
the U.S. Congress unilaterally provided that the United States
would not return tax receipts in excess of U.S.$10.50 per gallon
on rum entering the United States. 3 ' Prior to 1984, the entire
325. See supra note 186 and accompanying text (discussing Federal Relations Act).
The court stated that:
Congress may unilaterally repeal the Puerto Rican Constitution or the Puerto
Rican Federal Relations Act and replace them with any rules or regulations of
its choice. Despite passage of the Federal Relations Act and the Puerto Rican
Constitution, Puerto Rican courts continue to derive their authority to punish
from the United States Congress and prosecutions in Puerto Rican courts do
not fall within the dual sovereignty exception to the Double Jeopardy Clause.
992 F.2d at 1153.
326. 992 F.2d at 1152-53. The Sdnchez decision involves a clash between two fed-
eral appeals courts over the degree of autonomy possessed by the Commonwealth of
Puerto Rico. See United States v. Quifionez, 758 F.2d 40, 42 (1st Cir. 1985) (discussing
Puerto Rico as autonomous political entity and upholding bilateral pact); United States
v. Sinchez, 992 F.2d 1143, 1152-53 (lth Cir. 1993) (discussing Puerto Rico as territory
subject to U.S. Congress' plenary power). The 1st Circuit has held that Puerto Rico
ceased being a territory subject to the plenary powers of U.S. Congress upon adoption
of the compact. Quifonez, 758 F.2d. at 40. The 11th Circuit, however, concluded that
Puerto Rico was a territory subject to the plenary power of U.S. Congress. Sdnchez, 992
F.2d. at 1143. The Supreme Court refused to hear an appeal from the SAnchez deci-
sion, frustrating efforts to determine whether Puerto Rico should still be considered a
territory. Robert Friedman, Top court refuses to weigh Puerto Rico status, SAN JUAN STAR,
Feb. 23, 1994, at 6 [hereinafter Friedman, Top Court].
327. See supra note 186 and accompanying text (discussing Federal Relations Act).
328. Helfeld, First Circuit Address, supra note 181, at 463-68; TORRuELLA, supra
note 35, at 193.
329. Act of June 2, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-272, 84 Stat. 294 (1970); Act of Sept. 12,
1966, Pub. L. No. 89-571, 80 Stat. 764 (1966). In 1970, the U.S. Congress eliminated
additional diversity jurisdiction created under Section 41 of the Jones Act for the Fed-
eral District Court of Puerto Rico. Act ofJune 2, 1970, 84 Stat. at 298. In 1966, the U.S.
Congress provided life tenure for judges of the Federal District Court for the District of
Puerto Rico. Act of Sept. 12, 1966, 80 Stat. at 764; Leibowitz, supra note 14, at 30-31
(discussing unilateral U.S. Congressional changes to Federal Relations Act).
330. Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, H.R. 4170, 98th Cong. 2d Sess., 711-13, 1418-
20 (1984). Prior to 1984, all receipts on the federal tax on rum, minus administrative
costs, were returned to Puerto Rico. Id. Non-voting member of U.S. Congress Ron de
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tax receipts on rum were returned to Puerto Rico under Section
9 of the Federal Relations Act.331  Commentators reason that
should a plaintiff challenge these amendments, claiming that
the U.S. Congress violated the terms of the Federal Relations
Act, the Supreme Court33 2 would reject the suit.33 3
c. The U.S. Has Not Complied With Its Promises to Allow
Puerto Rico to Change its Status
Some argue that the U.S. Congress' failure to follow
through on its commitment before the United Nations in Gen-
eral Assembly Resolution 748 violates Resolution 1541. aa4 In
1953, U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower, in a speech before
the United Nations, recommended that the U.S. Congress grant
Puerto Rico complete or absolute independence in accord with
the wishes of the people of Puerto Rico. 3 5 Article 9 of Resolu-
tion 748 highlights the U.S. promise to permit a change in the
status of Puerto Rico.33 6 Resolution 748 provides that if either of
the parties desires change to the terms of the association, due
regard will be paid to either party's desires.33 7 The U.S. reiter-
Lugo acknowledged violation of a Commonwealth commitment to return all taxes col-
lected. Proposed Legislation, supra note 16, pt. 1, at 28 (statement of Ron de Lugo, Repre-
sentative from U.S: Virgin Islands); Leibowitz, supra note 14, at 30-31 (discussing unilat-
eral U.S. Congressional changes to Federal Relations Act).
331. Helfeld, First Circuit Address, supra note 181, at 466. Section 9 of the Federal
Relations Act specifically provides that "taxes collected ... on articles produced in Pu-
erto Rico and transported to the United States ... shall be covered into the Treasury of
Puerto Rico." Id.
332. See Harris v. Rosario, 446 U.S. 651 (1980) (discussing U.S. Congress' power to
treat residents of Puerto Rico differently than residents of states under Territorial
Clause).
333. Helfeld, First Circuit Address, supra note 181, at 465-67.
334. See Proposed Legislation, supra note 16, pt. I, at 5 (statement of former Resident
Commissioner Jaime Fuster) (discussing U.S. Congress' duty to allow Puerto Rico to
change its status); supra note 23 and accompanying text (discussing G.A. Res. 1541); see
supra note 20 and accompanying text (discussing G.A. Res. 748).
335. See Proposed Legislation, supra note 16, pt. I, at 5-6 (statement of former Resi-
dent Commissioner Jaime Fuster) (discussing U.S. Congress' duty to allow change to
Puerto Rico's status citing President Eisenhower's speech before the U.N. in 1953). Mr.
Fuster quoted former President Eisenhower as stating:
due regard will be paid to the will of both the Puerto Rican and American
peoples... in the eventuality that either of the parties to the mutually agreed
association may desire any change in the terms of this association.
Id. at 6.
336. G.A. Res. 748, supra note 20, art. IX, at 26.
337. Id.
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ated Eisenhower's promise in a concurrent resolution prepared
by the U.S. Senate and House of Representatives in 1979.38 The
U.S. Congress maintained its commitment to support Puerto
Rico's wish to determine its own political future and change its
relationship with the United States through open and demo-
cratic processes. 339 Authors contend that the U.S. Congress' fail-
ure thus far to grant a binding referendum on the status of the
island fails to uphold Principle VII(a) (3) of Resolution 1541340
because it prevents Puerto Rico from modifying its own status.341
d. Critics of the U.S. Congress are More Vocal in Light of U.S.
Inaction With Regard to Puerto Rico
Recent commentators are more vocal in their disapproval of
the U.S. Congress' failure to allow changes to Puerto Rico's sta-
tus. 42 In November 1990, 343 a newspaper criticized the U.S.
Congress for failing to execute its promise to allow a binding
plebiscite.344 The commentator emphasized the congressional
hypocrisy regarding Puerto Rico, in light of the U.S. Congress'
calls for self-determination in the Baltics and South Africa.345
338. S. Con. Res. 35, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979), 125 CONG. Rc. S 11,371 (daily
ed. Aug. 2, 1979).
339. Id.
340. G.A. Res. 1541, supra note 23, princ. VII(a) (3); see supra note 23 and accom-
panying text (discussing G.A. Res. 1541).
341. See e.g., U.N. Doc. A/AC.109/PV. 1390, supra note 17, at 26-28 (statement of
Kenneth McClintok Hern~ndez) (discussing U.S. Congress' failure to allow Puerto Rico
to alter its status); Proposed Legislation, supra note 16, pt. I, at 5 (statement of Jaime
Fuster).
342. U.N. Doc. A/AC.109/PV 1390, supra note 17, at 34 (statement of Ambassador
Diego Arria) (discussing United States treatment of Puerto Rico); see Van Dyke, supra
note 15, at 515-16 (maintaining that inconsistent control by U.S. Congress cannot be
allowed to exist indefinitely).
343. Pallid Promises to Puerto Rico, N.Y. TiMEs, Nov. 6, 1990, at A22.
344. Id.
345. Id. A congressional decision on a Puerto Rican plebiscite is
a serious matter, but no vote is possible unless Congress deals with it seriously.
Two years of dithering produced two very different Senate and House plebi-
scite measures that were left in the lurch when Congress adjourned. These
are the same lawmakers who can always find time to lecture the rest of the
world on the need for self-determination in the Baltic republics or in South
Africa .... Mainlanders have a duty to speak out for America's Caribbean
stepchild .... Congress has a poor record of respecting the wishes of Puerto
Ricans, [b]ut nothing can be done until Congress acts honorably and respon-
sibly, in behalf of its voteless and voiceless wards.
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Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan [D-NY] echoed this condemna-
tion of the U.S. Congress' failure to take action with regard to
Puerto Rico. 346 Senator Moynihan condemned the Senate's
block of the Puerto Rican plebiscite as a shameful act of consent
by silence, denying a right which was previously held out to Pu-
erto Ricans as inalienable.347
e. Disparate Voting Rights and Lack of Representation in the
U.S. Congress Highlight the Need to Alter Puerto
Rico's Status
Critics of Puerto Rico's status cite disparate voting rights
and Puerto Rico's lack of representation in the U.S. Congress in
order to further demonstrate the unequal treatment of Puerto
Rican citizens compared with stateside United States citizens. 48
Residents of Puerto Rico may not vote in federal elections. 49
Although Puerto Rico residents participate in the nomination
process for presidential elections, they do not vote in presiden-
tial elections. 350 Furthermore, Puerto Rico is allowed to elect
only a Resident Commissioner to the House of Representatives
for a four-year term.3 51 Although allowed to vote in committee,
the Resident Commissioner cannot vote when the full House
votes.352 Commentators argue that as long as the U.S. Congress
has plenary authority to govern Puerto Rico, pursuant to the
Territorial Clause, the Commissioner's inability to vote in U.S.
federal elections amounts to governance without representa-
346. U.N. Doc. A/AC.109/PV 1390, supra note 17, at 39 (Ambassador Diego Arria
quoting Senator Moynihan [D-N.Y.]).
347. Id.
The decision of the Senate Committee to block the Puerto Rican plebiscite
was the most shameful, negative exhibition I have seen in 15 years in the Sen-
ate .... To deny Puerto Rico that right [of self-determination] would be disas-
trous and would compromise the honor of the Congress. Silence gives Con-
sent. Our silence would mean that we agree to the denial of a right which we
have said for decades is inalienably possessed by the citizens of Puerto Rico.
Id.
348. U.S. GAO REPORT, supra note 15, at 5, 7; Helfeld, The Constitutional and Legal
Feasibility of the Presidential Vote for Puerto Rico, prepared for the AdHoc Advisory Group
on the Presidential Vote for Puerto Rico (1971); see Proposed Legislation, supra note 16,
pt. I, at 33 (statement of Luis A. Ferr6) (discussing disparate voting rights).
349. Dumas, Practice Makes PR A Force, supra note 269, at 4074.
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tion.353
III. THE US. CONGRESS SHOULD ENACT LEGISLATION
ALLOWING PUERTO RICO TO HOLD A BINDING
REFERENDUM TO MODIFY ITS STATUS
At present, both the U.S. Congress and U.S. courts treat Pu-
erto Rico's legal status inconsistently.3 54 Furthermore, all of the
leading political parties in Puerto Rico have called for a modifi-
cation to the current Commonwealth status.3 55 Because the Ter-
ritorial Clause provides the U.S. Congress with plenary power
over Puerto Rico, 56 Congress should modify Puerto Rico's cur-
rent status by enacting legislation that would permit a binding
plebiscite. Such a plebiscite would allow Puerto Rico to deter-
mine its status definitively through informed choice. 57
A. The Discrepancy in U.S. Congressional and Judicial Treatment of
Puerto Rico
The United States failed to observe its commitment to allow
Puerto Rico to become a self-governing territory in accordance
with Resolutions 742 and 1541.358 Although the U.S. Congress
provided for some degree of self-governance through Public
Laws 600 and 447,359 Congress failed to specify the parameters
governing the relationship between the United States and Pu-
353. Helfeld, supra note 348; Proposed Legislation, supra note 16, pt. I, at 33 (state-
ment of Luis A. Ferr6; Van Dyke, supra note 15, at 469-71 (discussing governance with-
out representation).
354. See supra note 330 and accompanying text (discussing Section 9 of Federal
Relations Act and U.S. Congress' unilateral decision to keep all taxes on rum over U.S.
$10.50 per gallon); Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. at 672-74
(1974) (treating Puerto Rico as state); cf Harris v. Rosario, 446 U.S. 651 (1980) (reaf-
firming U.S. Congress power to treat Puerto Rico residents differently than those of
States through Territorial Clause).
355. See supra note 16 and accompanying text (discussing political parties in Pu-
erto Rico and their platforms).
356. Harris v. Rosario, 446 U.S. 651 (1980); Califano v. Torres, 435 U.S. 1 (1978).
357. G.A. Res. 1541, supra note 23, princ. VII, at 29-30 (discussing choice of status
through informed and democratic processes).
358. See supra notes 112-21 and accompanying text (discussing adoption of Public
Laws 600 and 447). The requirements of a free associated territory discussed in Resolu-
tion 742 were further clarified in Resolution 1541. G.A. Res 1541, supra note 23.
359. See supra notes 112-21 and accompanying text (discussing adoption of Public
Laws 600 and 447).
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erto Rico. 360 As a result, U.S. court interpretations and U.S. leg-
islation are inconsistent in their treatment of the relationship
between Puerto Rico and the United States. 61 In some in-
stances, U.S. courts and the U.S. Congress treat the Common-
wealth of Puerto Rico as a state. In others, they treat the Com-
monwealth as a territory.3 62
The people of Puerto Rico have clearly expressed a desire to
change the status of the island.3 63  The recent 1989-91 congres-
sional hearings364 and the 1993 plebiscite 65 evidence this call
for change. Furthermore, all three of the major political parties
have called for change. 66 The PNP wants statehood, the PIP
seeks independence, and the PPD calls for an enhanced Com-
monwea'lth status.3 61 In fact, the original intent of former Gover-
nor Mufioz-Marin, founder of the PPD,"6 a was that Common-
wealth status would be temporary. 69
The U.S. Congress has denied all requests for change in Pu-
360. See supra notes 277-82 and accompanying text (discussing ambiguous phrase
"in the nature of a compact").
361. See Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 672-74 (1974)
(treating Puerto Rico as a State); cf Harris v. Rosario, 446 U.S. 651 (1980) (reaffirming
U.S. Congress' power to treat Puerto Rico residents differently than those of States
through Territorial Clause); see also Moscoso, PR's ambivalent status, supra note 181, at
34 (discussing unsettled status of Puerto Rico).
362. See Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 672-74 (treating Puerto Rico as a State); cf. Harris,
446 U.S. at 651 (maintaining U.S. Congress' power to treat residents of Puerto Rico
differently than those of U.S. states); see also Moscoso, PR's ambivalent status, supra note
181; Leibowitz, supra note 14, at 12-13 (discussing unsettled status of Puerto Rico).
363. Proposed Legislation, supra note 16; Donovan, Senate Gives OK, supra note 129,
at 2152. Thus, even the PPD, the party of Mufioz-Marin, which is responsible for the
island's current Commonwealth status, is not satisfied with the constitutional arrange-
ments presently in effect. Cabranes, First Circuit Address, supra note 13, at 482-83.
364. See supra notes 127-32 and accompanying text (discussing 1989-91 congres-
sional hearings on status of Puerto Rico).
365. See supra notes 133-36 and accompanying text (discussing 1993 status plebi-
scite).
366. Donovan, Senate Gives OK, supra note 129; see supra note 16 (discussing three
main political parties in Puerto Rico).
367. Donovan, Senate Gives OK, supra note 129.
368. See supra note 272 and accompanying text (discussing role of Mufioz-Marin in
Puerto Rico politics).
369. TORRUELLA, supra note 35, at 144. In a speech on July 4, 1948 Mufioz-Marin
emphasized that the Commonwealth status under consideration would be transitional
until such time as economic conditions permitted either independence or statehood.
Id; see Guillermo Moscoso, Destiny should not be overlooked, SANJu~A STAR, Apr. 8, 1991, at
16 [hereinafter Moscoso, Destiny Should Not Be Overlooked].
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erto Rico's current political status.37 ° In 1967, there was an over-
whelming vote in Puerto Rico for enhanced commonwealth sta-
tus, yet the U.S. Congress ignored Puerto Ricans' vote for
change. 371  More recently, in the 1989-91 congressional hear-
ings, proposals for a binding referendum failed.372 Senate Bill
712 offered the people of Puerto Rico the opportunity to vote on
the status of the island with actual knowledge of the provisions
of each choice. 73 Furthermore, Senate Bill 712, a "self-execut-
ing" bill,374 would have finally committed the U.S. government
to specific plans for implementation of each option.375
Although the House passed a bill, the Senate rejected it.3 76 The
U.S. Senate bill would have established detailed provisions for
implementing the three status choices: statehood, indepen-
dence, and enhanced commonwealth.377
Most recently, in the 1993 plebiscite, Puerto Ricans once
again called for a change in their status.378 However, this plebi-
370. U.N. Doc. A/AC.109/PV 1390, supra note 17, at 37-40 (statement of Mr. Di-
ego Arria); see Cabranes, supra note 13, at 483-84.
371. Proposed Legislation, pt. I, supra note 16, at 22 (statement of Rafael Hernfindez
Colon); Puerto Rico Vote Strongly Favors A Commonwealth, N.Y. TIMES, July 24, 1967, at 1.
The vote was greater than 60% for enhanced commonwealth. Id. See also, Leibowitz,
supra, note 14, at 30-31 n.119 (discussing '67 Plebiscite and vote for enhanced Com-
monwealth).
372. Dumas, Referendum Bill Appears Dead, supra note 132 at 538; Kitty Dumas, Fad-
ing Support, Lack of Time May Hinder Status Bills, 49 CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 243 (1991)
[hereinafter Dumas, Fading Support, Lack of Time]; Dumas, Practice Makes Puerto Rico A
Force, supra note 269, at 4074; Dumas, House Passes PR Bill, supra note 131, at 3413; Kitty
Dumas, House Interior Approves Bill To Give Puerto Rico Choice, 48 CONG. Q. WKLY. REP.
3009 (1990) [hereinafter Dumas, House Interior Approves]; Kitty Dumas, Measure on Puerto
Rico's Status Hits Snags in Both Chambers, 48 CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 2506 (1990) [hereinaf-
ter, Dumas, Measure on PR's Status]; Beth Donovan, Potential Cost of Statehood Far Exceeds
Other Options, 47 CONG. Q. WKLv. REP. 3452 (1989) [hereinafter Donovan, Potential Cost
of Statehood]; Donovan, Senate Committee Gives OK, supra note 129, at 2152; Beth Dono-
van, Puerto Rico Referendum OK'd Amid Charges of 'Slant', 47 CONG. Q. WKv. REP. 2024
(1989) [hereinafter Donovan, PR Referendum OK'd]; Beth Donovan, Senators Debate
Cost to U.S. Of Puerto Rican Statehood, 47 CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 1955 (1989) [hereinaf-
ter Donovan, Senate Debates Cost to US]; Donovan, Age Old Status Question, supra note 4, at
1759.
373. Donovan, Senate Debates Cost to US, supra note 372, 1955; see supra note 127-32
and accompanying text (discussing 1989-91 failed congressional hearings to propose
political status referendum).
374. See supra note 3 (discussing nature of self-executing legislation).
375. Donovan, Age Old Status Question, supra note 4, at 1759.
376. Dumas, Referendum Bill Appears Dead, supra note 132, at 538.
377. Donovan, Age Old Status Question, supra note 4, at 1759.
378. Padilla, supra note 1, at 31; Rohter, 3 Ex-Presidents, supra note 134, at 8;
Rohter, P.R. Votes, supra note 1, at Al.
US. -PUERTO RICO RELATIONSHIP
scite was non-binding.3 79 Despite the fact that none of the 1993
plebiscite options garnered a clear majority,3 ° the plurality vote
presents some important points for U.S. congressional action.
First, the commonwealth option, which won by a 2% margin,
called for modification to Puerto Rico's current commonwealth
government.3 ' The statehood option, which obtained 46% per-
cent of the votes, also called for change to the current status.382
Accordingly, a great majority of Puerto Ricans3 83 reject the pres-
ent status.38 4 In addition, the majority of Puerto Ricans have
opted for a status that calls for a permanent union with the
United States either as a state or as an "enhanced" common-
wealth. 8 5
President Bill Clinton's response to the plebiscite results was
to direct the formation of an Inter-Agency Working Group to
study the 1993 plebiscite proposals and results. 8 6 Although
President Clinton's administration is aware that the PPD38 7 seeks
to enhance the current commonwealth relationship between Pu-
erto Rico and the United States, the President has not com-
mented on the possibility of enhancement.388 Despite calls from
a majority of the people in Puerto Rico to change the current
status,38 9 the United States has thus far declined to enable
change. This reluctance to modify the current U.S.-Puerto Rico
379. Padilla, supra note 1, at 31 (discussing non-binding nature of plebiscite and
fact that this was not really plebiscite); see supra note 3 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing nature of plebiscite); supra notes 133-36 and accompanying text (discussing 1993
plebiscite purpose and results).
380. Matos, supra note 1, at 3. The Commonwealth option received 48% of votes,
the Statehood option 46%, and the Independence option 4%. Id.
381. Robert Friedman, Clinton supports Puerto Rico plebiscite results, SAN JuAN STAR,
Nov. 16, 1993, at 4. Among the changes proposed were: restoration of 936 tax program
cuts, extension of Supplemental Security Insurance, and protection of island agricul-
tural products through federal tariffs. Id.
382. See supra note 136 and accompanying text (discussing results of Nov. 14 plebi-
scite).
383. Garcia, Final plebiscite results, supra note 136, at 12. Of the 2.3 million regis-
tered voters, 1.7 million ballots were cast. Id. Therefore, 73.5% voters participated. Id.
384. Juan M. Garcia Passalacqua, Presenting plebiscite results to Congress, SAN JUAN
STAR, Jan. 21, 1994, at 33; Guillermo Moscoso, Analyst way off mark, SANJuAN STAR, Dec.
11, 1993, at 33 [hereinafter Moscoso, Analyst Way Offl.
385. Moscoso, Analyst way off, supra note 384, at 33.
386. Letter from Marcia Hale to Ron de Lugo, supra note 137, at 2.
387. See supra note 16 (discussing political parties in Puerto Rico).
388. Friedman, Clinton supports P.R plebiscite results, supra note 381, at 4.
389. See supra notes 125-42 and accompanying text (discussing 1967 plebiscite,
1989-91 congressional hearings, and 1993 plebiscite).
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relationship is contrary to Principle VII of Resolution 1541.90
Current U.S treatment of Puerto Rico fails to comply with
the non-reporting requirements of Resolution 748, as detailed in
Resolutions 742 and 1541.391 The plenary power granted to the
U.S. Congress through the Territorial Clause392 continues to al-
low discriminatory treatment of Puerto Rico, as evidenced by
federal judicial decisions393 and unilateral changes to the com-
pact.3 94 This unequal treatment does not comply with Resolu-
tion 742, which qualifies a territory as self-governing if it achieves
this status on a basis of absolute equality with the citizens of the
central authority. 95
The U.S. Congress has insisted that all changes to the Pu-
erto Rico Constitution conform with the U.S. Constitution, Pub-
lic Laws 600 and 447,396 and the Federal Relations Act.3 97 This
requirement has ensured the continuance of the U.S. Congress'
plenary authority with respect to Puerto Rico by controlling all
changes to the Puerto Rico Constitution.3 98 This failure to allow
Puerto Rico to change its status does not comply with Principle
VII of Resolution 1541, which maintains that a territory should
be free to modify its status.399
390. G.A. Res. 1541, supra note 23, princ. VII, at 29-30.
391. See supra notes 148-72 and accompanying text (discussing terms of Resolu-
tions 742 and 1541).
392. Harris v. Rosario, 446 U.S. 651 (1980) (noting continued application of Terri-
torial Clause); Califano v. Torres, 435 U.S. 1, 3 n.4 (1978) (noting continued applica-
tion of Territorial Clause); U.S. GAO REPORT, supra note 15, at 29.
393. Harris, 446 U.S. at 651 (failing to extend AFDC program on equal basis to
residents of Puerto Rico); Califano, 435 U.S. at 1 (failing to extend SSI benefits to Pu-
erto Rico on an equal basis); United States v. Sanchez, 992 F.2d 1143 (1lth Cir. 1993)
(stating that Congress, through Territorial Clause may treat Puerto Rico differently);
Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v. Mun. of San Juan, 505 F. Supp. 533 (P.R. Dec. 1980) (maintain-
ing that Commerce Clause is binding on Puerto Rico through Territorial Clause).
394. See supra notes 327-33 and accompanying text (discussing unilateral changes
to Federal Relations Act).
395. See G.A. Res. 742, supra note 23, Annex, 1 A(6), B(3), at 22 (maintaining
that territories achieving self-government through free association must do so on basis
of absolute equality).
396. See supra notes 112-21 and accompanying text (discussing enactment of Pub-
lic Laws 600 and 447).
397. CARR, supra note 11, at 79-80.
398. See supra notes 207-12, 274-76 and accompanying text (discussing manner in
which Puerto Rico Constitution can be changed).
399. G.A. Res. 1541, supra note 23, Annex, princ. VII, at 29-30 (maintaining that
territories achieving self-government through free association should be free to modify
their status).
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B. Resolving the Discrepancy
Both the U.S. Congress and the U.S. judiciary have failed to
protect the fights of Puerto Rico residents under the "compact"
governing the present status. 00 Continued disparate treatment
of Puerto Rico creates a negative precedent 0 1 for further self-
determination efforts. The U.S. treatment of Puerto Rico is par-
ticularly disturbing in light of U.S. foreign policy that encour-
ages self-determination and seeks to eradicate colonialism.40
The United States must remedy the situation in Puerto Rico to
maintain the integrity of American democratic government and
U.S. foreign policy. In the Insular Cases, the U.S. Supreme Court
held that the doctrine of territorial incorporation provides the
U.S. Congress with plenary authority to govern the U.S. insular
areas. 40 3 Therefore, it is the U.S. Congress, and not the judici-
ary, that should provide the mechanism for the modification of
Puerto Rico's status.
The U.S. Congress should enact legislation allowing for a
binding plebiscite to allow residents of Puerto Rico to determine
their status through informed choice.40 4 The status choices
should not be subject to the Territorial Clause or the plenary
power of the U.S. Congress. The continued application of the
Territorial Clause prevents Puerto Ricans from claiming all the
constitutional guarantees offered by the U.S. Constitution 4 5 and
allows the U.S. Congress to pass legislation that impacts Puerto
Rico without the participation of members from Puerto Rico.40 6
To comply with Principle VII of Resolution 1541, the U.S. Con-
gress should put an end to Puerto Rico's quasi-colonial status
and allow Puerto Ricans to choose freely their political status. 40 7
400. See supra notes 112-21 (discussing compact theory).
401. See supra note 22 and accompanying text (discussing Northern Mariana Is-
lands).
402. U.N. Doc. A/AC.109/PV 1390, supra note 17, at 39 (statement of Mr. Diego
Arria) (quoting statement of Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan [D-N.Y.]).
403. See supra notes 41-78 and accompanying text (discussing Insular Cases and
U.S. Congress' plenary power to govern territories under Territorial Clause); supra note
22 (discussing U.S. policy of decolonization).
404. G.A. Res. 1541, supra note 23, Annex, prin. VII, at 29-30 (discussing adoption
of free association status through informed choice).
405. Harris v. Rosario, 446 U.S. 651 (1980); Del Valle, supra note 43, at 79-80.
406. See supra notes 348-53 and accompanying text (discussing Puerto Rico's in-
ability to vote in federal elections and lack of a voting representative in U.S. Congress).
407. See G.A. Res. 1541, supra note 23, Annex, princ. VII, at 29-30.
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The U.S. Congress should not subject residents of Puerto Rico to
treatment different from that afforded to other U.S. citizens.
General Assembly Resolution 742 calls for equal extension to the
associated territory of constitutional guarantees of the central
authority and citizenship on the same basis as other inhabitants
of the central authority.40 8 By treating residents of Puerto Rico
differently from stateside U.S. citizens, Congress has failed to
abide by the mandates of Resolution 742.409
The U.S. Congress should pass legislation that calls for a
binding referendum with clearly delineated status choices.
Without a commitment on the provisions of each option, Con-
gress will once again unjustifiably ask Puerto Ricans to vote on a
series of hypothetical options that result in a "bilateral compact"
that is not clearly defined.410 By contrast, a self-executing bill
that narrowly defines descriptions of each status option will allow
the people of Puerto Rico to modify their status in a manner that
is not subject to later congressional amendment.411
Despite the lessons learned from the November 14, 1993 re-
sults, this plebiscite was not a valid method to determine the Pu-
erto Rican people's choice regarding their future relationship
with the United States. The ballots in the November plebiscite
only consisted of representative geometric symbols.412 This poll
did not provide the electorate with full knowledge of their
choices, as mandated by Resolution 1541, for a change in a terri-
tory's status.413
The binding plebiscite should list the three status options
approved by Resolutions 742414 and 1541415 with a detailed de-
scription of the independence option, the statehood option, and
the enhanced commonwealth/ELA option.416 The U.S. Con-
408. G.A. Res. 742, supra note 23, Annex, pt. III, 6, at 23.
409. Id.
410. See supra notes 260-82 and accompanying text (discussing ambiguity of bilat-
eral compact).
411. See supra note 260 and accompanying text (discussing unilateral changes to
Puerto Rico Constitution).
412. Salsa With Fries, supra note 1, at 28-29.
413. See G.A. Res. 1541, supra note 23, Annex, princ. VII, at 29-30 (discussing Prin-
ciple VII's mandate for voluntary and informed choice).
414. See G.A. Res. 742, supra note 23, Annex, at 22-23 (listing three status options).
415. See G.A. Res. 1541, supra note 23, Annex, at 29-30 (listing three status op-
tions).
416. See supra note 134 (discussing 1993 provisions for enhanced commonwealth
status); Donovan, Senate Gives OK, supra note 129 (discussing 1990 provisions for en-
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gress and the Puerto Rico Legislature should submit the details
for each status option to discussion and revision prior to the ref-
erendum. In this manner the voters' will base their choice on
actual knowledge, allowing for a truly bilateral process.
C. Difficulties in Implementing a Binding Plebiscite
A binding plebiscite that narrowly defines each status op-
tion and removes Congress' plenary power under the Territorial
Clause4" 7 is the most viable solution to the present non-compli-
ance of the U.S.-Puerto Rico relationship with the mandates of
Resolutions 742 and 1541.41" Nevertheless, implementing these
changes will present a number of difficulties. First, there is no
voting representative in Congress to bring about this change. 1 9
Without a vote, Puerto Rico's Resident Commissioner in the U.S.
Congress must rely on members of Congress from the fifty states
of the U.S. to advocate Puerto Rico's cause.420 Despite the hur-
dles presented by the lack of federal representation, Puerto Rico
has been able to put its status on the political agenda in the past,
as it did in the 1989-91 hearings. Puerto Rico has overcome its
lack of representation by employing a number of powerful Wash-
ington law firms to lobby for its cause.421 Residents of Puerto
Rico, representing various interests, have also participated in
hearings conducted by the United Nations to discuss the validity
of the current status of Puerto Rico.4 2 Thus, political lobbying
coupled with pressure from the international community has
hanced commonwealth). The PPD does not propose to continue the current ELA but
instead calls for Enhanced ELA. Id. The 1990 Senate Committee Provisions for the
enhanced ELA included: 1) governor appointment of a Senate liaison; 2) expedited
congressional procedures to consider requests by the Puerto Rican Governor to waive
U.S. law if there is no overriding interest; 3) request of waivers from federal rules and
regulations that do not take into account local conditions; 4) gubernatorial consulta-
tions in federal appointments to Puerto Rico; 5) local authority over foreign airline
landing rights; 6) independent foreign trade agreements; 7) authority to restrict im-
ports. Id.
417. See supra note 9 (discussing Territorial Clause).
418. See supra notes 148-72 and accompanying text (discussing mandates of Reso-
lutions 742 and 1541).
419. See supra notes 348-53 and accompanying text (discussing Puerto Rico's lack
of representation in Congress).
420. See Romero Barcel6, supra note 219, at VI-V2 (discussing frustration of being
disenfranchised as Puerto Rico's sole representative in Congress).
421. Dumas, Practice Makes Puerto Rico a Force, supra note 372, at 4077-78 (discussing
lobbying efforts and firms employed to carry this out).
422. U.N. Doc. A/AC.109/PV.1390, supra note 17.
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been used in the past and may be relied upon again to persuade
the U.S. Congress to revisit the issue of Puerto Rico's status.
Another factor that will inhibit implementation of a binding
referendum is the formation of a definition for enhanced com-
monwealth that satisfies both the P.P.D. and the U.S. Con-
gress.423 Some commentators have suggested that the common-
wealth option is untenable due to its cost to the United States.4 2 4
Furthermore, the commonwealth option may not be as easily de-
fined as the statehood option, as it would entail a modification
to the current status and require a compromise by both the PPD
and the U.S. Congress. However, the 1989-91 congressional
hearings arrived at an agreement for the provisions of an en-
hanced commonwealth.425 An agreement is therefore attaina-
ble, as it has been reached in the past, and the resulting provi-
sions may serve as the basis for a future enhanced common-
wealth definition.
An additional aspect confronting this binding referendum
is the lack of consensus in Puerto Rico regarding the island's
choice of status.426 Despite this lack of consensus, Congress is
capable of drafting a self-executing bill that details the provisions
for each status option. A binding plebiscite with sufficiently de-
fined status options will serve two purposes. First, a detailed de-
scription of each status option will enable the Puerto Rico electo-
rate to make an informed and decisive choice from the options
presented. Second, the process of negotiating the terms for
each option will inform the Puerto Rico electorate and en-
courage electoral participation, because voters will be making a
real, not a hypothetical, choice.
Despite the difficulties in implementing a binding referen-
dum, it is certainly within the reach of the parties involved. Fur-
thermore, the United States has an obligation to permit Puerto
423. Romero Barcel6, supra note 219, at VI-V2 (stating that commonwealth is not
financially viable); Dumas, Measure on Puerto Rico's Status, supra note 372 (discussing
provisions for tax credits and matching funds); see supra note 16 (discussing three main
political parties).
424. Romero Barcel6, supra note 219, at VI-VII (stating that commonwealth is not
financially viable); Dumas, Measure on PR's Status, supra note 372 (discussing provisions
for tax credits and matching funds).
425. See supra note 416 (discussing 1990 enhanced commonwealth provisions).
426. Helfeld, First Circuit Address, supra note 181, at 473 (discussing lack of consen-
sus as an impediment to change); Romero Barcel6, supra note 219, at VI (discussing
fact that no party won a clear majority in 1993 plebiscite).
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Rico to implement a status option that is satisfactory to both the
residents of Puerto Rico and the U.S. government. President
Clinton, in directing the organization of an Inter-Agency Work-
ing Group on Puerto Rico, 427 has acknowledged both the com-
plexities involved in the U.S.-Puerto Rico relationship and the
obligation of the United States to act on the results of the 1993
plebiscite. Although the creation of the Inter-Agency Working
Group allows for a dialogue between political leaders in Puerto
Rico and the U.S. Government, this is merely a preliminary step.
The U.S. Congress must continue to work to solve the current
problems in the U.S.-Puerto Rico relationship, instead of merely
staving off further public criticism by having the U.S. President
name a committee to discuss and rediscuss a longstanding prob-
lem.428
CONCLUSION
The U.S. Congress should revisit Puerto Rico's current
Commonwealth status. The "compact" theory that purports to
govern the relationship between Puerto Rico and the United
States has failed to define this relationship clearly. The inappro-
priate classification of Puerto Rico as a self-governing territory
has its origin in a combination of unclear drafting and political
and judicial misinterpretation. The system implemented by the
"compact" fails to protect the rights of the people of Puerto Rico
as U.S. citizens. In order to allow Puerto Rico to be self-gov-
erning in compliance with the United Nations General Assembly
Resolutions 742 and 1541, the U.S. Congress should enact a self-
executing bill that allows for a binding plebiscite to determine
the island's status. In short, the United States should comply
with international law and eradicate colonialism within its own
borders in the same manner it expects other nations to comply
with its calls for self-determination and decolonization.
Dorian A. Shaw*
427. See supra notes 137-39 and accompanying text (discussing creation of Inter-
Agency Working Group).
428. Robert Friedman, PDP gets its wish in new committee, SAN JuAN STAR, Mar. 13,
1994, at VI-V2.
* J.D. Candidate, 1995, Fordham University.
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